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Last Tenn:
Gail ATWATERet al., Petitioners
V.
CITY OF LAGO VISTA, et al., Respondents
No. 99-1408
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided April 24, 2001
Police Gain in Powers of Arrest, Supreme Court OK's Detention in
Minor Cases
The Boston Globe
Wednesday, April 25, 2001
Lyle Denniston
A narrowly divided Supreme Court
yesterday gave police sweeping authority
to arrest and jail individuals who break
even minor criminal laws such as failing
to fasten a car's seat belt.
The 5-4 ruling upheld the arrest and hour-
long jailing of a Texas mother who had
been pulled over by a police officer in
1997 for not wearing a seat belt and for
not attaching the belts of her two
children. She ultimately paid a $50 fine.
The court, answering a legal question that
it had never faced in 210 years of US
constitutional history, declared that
officers may take into custody for at least
a brief period anyone they believe has
broken a law, whether serious or not.
"The country is not confronting anything
like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-
offense arrests," so it is doubtful that the
situation "needs constitutional attention,"
Justice David H Souter wrote for the
majonty.
Police, according to the decision, do not
need an arrest warrant when they
encounter someone engaging in what they
believe is law- breaking. All that is
constitutionally required is "probable
cause," that is, the officer must have a
basis for concluding that a crime
has been committed.
182
Under a 1991 Supreme Court decision,
police may hold a person for
up to 48 hours before taking the person to
a judge or magistrate to determine
whether the detention is justified.
Souter stressed that courts are not to
second-guess whether the crime was
serious enough to justify detaining the
individual. The court, he added, refused to
create a new constitutional right insulating
an individual from being taken into
custody and held when the crime involved
could result only in a fine, not jail time.
With the Constitution no barrier to such
arrests and detention, the court majority
said individuals confronted by police
could depend on "the common sense" of
the officers not to routinely make arrests
for petty crimes, or on the political
accountability of local government
officials who oversee the police.
The muling is not likely to lead to many
arrests in Massachusetts for traffic
violations that could result only in fines,
according to Captain Robert J. Bird, a
spokesman for the State Police.
"In Massachusetts, there are a limited
number of motor vehicle violations where
the officer has the power to arrest," he
said. A driver cannot be stopped by police
simply for not wearing a seat belt, though
an officer can pull over a car in which a
child 12 or under is not wearing a belt.
But no seat belt infractions are offenses
for which a person may be arrested.
There are five traffic violations, such as
driving without a license or driving a
stolen car, in which a conviction could
lead to either a fine or imprisonment
under Massachusetts law, Bird said.
There has been no question of police
authority to arrest in those circumstances.
Only one traffic violation in
Massachusetts - failure to produce a
driver's license when asked - results only
in a fine and still could lead to an arrest,
he said. Yesterday's ruling settles the
question of police authority in that type of
situation.
The decision was a surprise because its
author, Souter, usually votes with the
court's liberal bloc in siding with
individual rights in police encounters.
Moreover, the dissent was written by
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who
normally votes with the court's
conservative bloc to uphold police
authority.
Joining Souter in the majority were Chief
Justice William H Rehnquist and Justices
Anthony M. Kennedy, Antonin Scalia, and
Clarence Thomas. O'Connor's dissent was
supported by Justices Stephen G. Breyer,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and John Paul
Stevens.
The dissenters condemned the ruling for
giving police unbounded discretion that
carries grave potential for abuse. "As the
recent debate over racial profiling
demonstrates all too clearly, a relatively
minor traffic infraction may often serve as
an excuse for stopping and harassing an
individual," O'Connor said.
Stephen R Shapiro, legal director of the
American Civil Liberties Union, called the
ruling "extremely disturbing," adding that
"the most disturbing to us is that this
opens the door to arrest of any
motorist around the country for any trivial
offense."
Though the Texas woman was white,
Shapiro said the ruling stirs fears that this
authority would be exercised in a racially
discriminatory way, with police using
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minor traffic violations as a pretext for
targeting "drivers of color."
The ruling won the praise of the National
Association of Police Organizations.
Stephen R. McSpadden, general counsel
of the group of 4,000 police organizations,
said that if the ruling had gone the
other way, "each time a police officer
made an arrest for a traffic offense, he
could be subject to a lawsuit for violating
a constitutional right."
The motoring public, he said, is protected,
because "if the police arrest everybody,
there is going to be political protest."
Yesterday's ruling involved Gail Atwater,
who lives in the Austin suburb of Lago
Vista. On March 26, 1997, she was driving
a pickup truck with her two children,
going home from soccer practice, when
an officer she had encountered before
pulled her over.
She later said the officer was loud and
abusive, and frightened the children. The
children were not arrested only because
neighbors intervened to take them. The
officer handcuffed Atwater and took her
to a police station for booking. She was
kept in a jail cell for an hour until a
magistrate ordered her release.
She pleaded no contest to failure to fasten
the seat belts in the pickup, and paid a $50
fine. She later sued, contending that her
arrest and detention violated her Fourth
Amendment rights against an
"unreasonable" seizure. The court rejected
her claim.
The case is Atwater v. Lago Vista, 99-
1408.
In a second 5-4 ruling yesterday, the court
barred private individuals from filing
lawsuits contending that federally funded
programs are operated in a way that
discriminates, in practice, on the basis of
race or ethnic background.
The court rejected a lawsuit by a group of
Spanish-speaking motorists in Alabama,
who contended that a state motor vehicle
policy of giving driver's license tests only
in English has the effect of
discriminating on the basis of ethnic
background. (Massachusetts offers the
driver's license test in 25 languages.)
In an opinion written by Scalia, the court
said private individuals have a right to sue
only when a federally funded program
involves intentional race or ethnic
discrimination.
The case is Alexander v. Sandoval, 99-
1908.
Copyright c 2001 The Boston Globe
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Last Tenn:
Danny Lee KYLLO, et al., Petitioners
V.
UNITED STATES of America, Respondent
No. 99-8508
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided June 11, 2001
Court Shields Homes From High-Tech Scrutiny By Police Heat Sensor Found
Lights For Marijuana
The Boston Globe
Tuesday, June 12, 2001
Lyle Denniston
The Supreme Court, fearing a high-tech
future in which police with special
scanners could detect what is happening
inside a private home, ruled 5 to 4
yesterday that officers must get
a search warrant to use such devices.
"The question we confront," Justice
Antonin Scalia wrote for the majority, "is
what limits there are upon the power of
technology to shrink the realm of
guaranteed privacy" under the
Constitution.
Specifically, the court ruled it
unconstitutional for police without a
warrant to use a heat-sensing device aimed
at the outside of a house to seek evidence
of crime - in this case growing marijuana -
inside the dwelling.
But the ruling went well beyond that
specific circumstance, laying down a
broad "bright-line rule" that would apply
to all sophisticated devices that may yet be
developed that increase police surveillance
capability by allowing them to "see" inside
homes and detect what they could not
view with their own eyes.
As long as the devices that police use for
surveillance are "not in general public
use," the court said, the use of new
technology will be treated as a search
limited by the Constitution's warrant
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requirement, as specified in the Fourth
Amendment's privacy guarantee.
The court refused to draw the protective
line of privacy so that it would shield
homes only from physical intrusion by
police, saying "that would leave the
homeowner at the mercy of advancing
technology, including imaging technology
that could discern all human activity in
the home."
Beyond the heat-sensing device at issue in
the case before the court, Scalia noted that
directional microphones, monitoring
satellites miles in the sky, and radar
scanners that can look through
walls now exist or are being developed to
aid police.
The court's ruling came in the case of
Danny Lee Kyllo of Florence, Ore., who
was challenging his conviction for illegally
growing marijuana after an officer gauged
the heat coming from his house by using a
thermal imager that works like a video
camera but shows only heat rays.
There was extra heat coming from Kyllo's
house, which the officer concluded was a
sign that Kyllo was using high-intensity
lamps inside to aid in growing marijuana.
With that and other information, officers
got a search warrant and found more than
100 plants growing inside.
Kyllo argued that the use of the heat
sensor was a search, and that police
needed a warrant to use that device. The
court agreed, and sent the case back to
lower courts to decide what to do about
Kyllo's conviction and his 63-month
pnson sentence.
The decision produced unusual lineups
within the court. Scalia, one of the court's
most conservative members, drew the
support not only of fellow conservative
Justice Clarence Thomas, but also of
three of the court's more liberal members,
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, David H Souter
and Stephen G. Breyer.
Justice John Paul Stevens, another liberal,
wrote the dissenting opinion, joined by
three members of the court's conservative
bloc: Chief Justice William H Rehnquist
and Justices Anthony M. Kennedy and
Sandra Day O'Connor.
The dissenting justices protested that the
heat sensor did not pick up anything
going on inside Kyllo's home, and
certainly nothing that was "intimate." But
Scalia retorted, "In the home, all details
are intimate details, because the entire area
is held safe from prying government
eyes.
If police were allowed to use a heat sensor
without having a court's permission, Scalia
said, the device might monitor something
as intimate as determining the hour each
day that "the lady of the house" took her
bath.
The case is Kyllo v. US, 99-8508.
Copyright D 2001 The Boston Globe
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Last Tenn:
Crystal M. FERGUSON, et al., Petitioners
V.
CITY OF CHARLESTON, et al.
No. 99-936
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided March 21, 2001
Drug Test of Pregnant Women Without Consent Is Banned
The New Yok Times
Thursday, March 22, 2001
Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court ruled yesterday that
hospital workers cannot test maternity
patients for illegal drug use without their
consent if the purpose is to alert the
police to a crime.
The 6-3 decision did not finally resolve a
10-year-old lawsuit brought against the
city of Charleston, S.C, by women who
were arrested, under a cooperative
program between a public hospital and
the police department, after a positive
unne test for cocaine. The question of
whether any of the 10 plaintiffs actually
consented to the tests remains to be
decided in the lower courts.
But the majority opinion by Justice John
Paul Stevens was a strong statement that
the facts of the women's pregnancy and of
possible danger to their fetuses through
illegal drug use did not change the basic
constitutional analysis: in the absence of
either a warrant or consent, the drug tests
amounted to unconstitutional searches.
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote a
separate concurring opinion. Justice
Antonin Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion
that was joined by Chief Justice William
H. Rehnquist and Justice Carence
Thomas.
The court overturned a 1999 decision by
the federal appeals court in Richmond
that regardless of whether the women
provided informed consent, the
warrantless drug testing program was
justified by the "special needs" of
stopping drug use by pregnant women
and getting the women into treatment.
Stevens said that the "special needs"
exception to the Fourth Amendment,
which the court has recognized in limited
circumstances to justify drug testing for
health and safety purposes, did not apply
to a program that was so directly
connected to law enforcement.
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"The central and indispensable feature of
the policy from its inception was the use
of law enforcement to coerce the patients
into substance abuse treatment," Stevens
said. "While the ultimate goal of the
program may well have been to get the
women in question into substance abuse
treatment and off of drugs," he continued,
"the immediate objective of the searches
was to generate evidence for law
enforcement purposes in order to reach
that goal."
And that was the constitutional problem,
Stevens said: because law enforcement
"always serves some broader social
purpose or objective," a statement of a
worthy ultimate goal could not suffice to
insulate a particular law enforcement
program from constitutional scrutiny.
The "stark and unique fact" of this case,
he said, was that the cooperative program
between the hospital and the police "was
designed to obtain evidence of criminal
conduct by the tested patients that
would be turned over to the police and
that could be admissible in subsequent
criminal prosecutions."
Although the legal issue before the court
yesterday in Ferguson v. Charleston, No.
99-936, was a narrow one, the case
touched on deeper questions about
medical privacy in general and the rights
of pregnant women in particular.
The hospital of the Medical University of
South Carolina and the Charleston police
devised the drug-testing program in the
face of growing concern about the fate of
"crack babies" born to cocaine-using
mothers.
At the time, the late 1980s and early
1990s, jurisdictions around the country
were considering various novel legal
theories for prosecuting pregnant women
for behavior that endangered their fetuses,
to the concern of many medical
professionals who warned that the most
direct effect would be to frighten women
who were using drugs away from prenatal
care.
Organizations including the American
Medical Association and the American
Public Health Association filed briefs with
the court on behalf of the plaintiffs that
made that argument. Stevens took explicit
note of the briefs, saying that in light of
them, "it is especially difficult to argue
that the program here was designed
simplyto save lives."
Before Charleston first modified and then
dropped its program after several years, 30
women were arrested, with nearly all the
charges dropped after the women agreed
to enter treatment. Some who
tested positive for cocaine during labor
were taken to jail in handcuffs or leg
shackles shortly after giving birth. The
hospital did not test all its maternity
patients, only those who met certain
criteria, many of which con-elated with
poverty
In his dissenting opinion, Scalia said the
fact that the public employees and
officials who participated in the program
might now face damages for violating the
women's constitutional rights "proves
once again that no good deed goes
unpunished." He said the program
served a legitimate medical purpose, and
the fact that it served a law enforcement
purpose as well should not take it outside
the scope of the court's "special needs"
doctrine.
The court has applied that doctrine a
handful of times, to justify the drug
testing of student athletes, Customs
agents and railroad workers involved in
train accidents, all in the absence of the
188
warrants that would ordinarily be
required.
Copyright D 2001 The New York Tims
Company
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Last Tern:
CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS, et al., Petitioners
V.
James EDMOND, et al., Respondents
No. 99-1030
Decided may 14, 2001
Court Strikes Down Drug Checkpoints
The Associated Pirss
Tuesday, November 28, 2000
Anne Gearan
In a significant ruling on the use of
police power, the Supreme Court struck
down random roadblocks intended for
drug searches, saying they are an
unreasonable invasion of privacy under
the Constitution.
Law enforcement in and of itself is not a
good enough reason to stop innocent
motorists, the majority concluded
Tuesday in the first major ruling of the
new term.
"Because the checkpoint program's
primary purpose is indistinguishable
from the general interest in crime
control, the checkpoints contravened the
Fourth Amendment," which protects
against unreasonable searches and
seizures, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
wrote.
The court's three most conservative
justices dissented, saying the roadblocks
Indianapolis set up in high-crime
neighborhoods served valuable public
safety and crime-fighting goals. Chief
Justice William Rehnquist and Justices
Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas
dissented.
"Efforts to enforce the law on public
highways used by millions of motorists
are obviously necessary to our society,"
Rehnquist wrote. "The court's opinion
today casts a shadow over what has been
assumed ... to be a perfectly lawful
activity."
Thomas joined the entire nine-page
dissent. Scalia agreed with Rehnquist
only in part.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, like O'Connor
a sometime "swing vote" between the
court's ideological poles, sided with her
in the majority.
The American Civil Liberties Union had
sued on behalf of two detained
motorists, and the 7th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals in Chicago eventually found
the practice was probably
unconstitutional.
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"Today's decision sends a clear message
that even a conservative court is not
willing to countenance the serious
erosion of our basic constitutional
rights," said Steven Shapiro, ACLU's
legal director.
O'Connor stressed that the high court
ruling does not affect other police
roadblocks such as border checks and
drunken-driving checkpoints, which
have already been found constitutional.
But the reasoning behind those kinds of
roadblocks - chiefly that the benefit to
the public outweighs the inconvenience -
cannot be applied broadly, O'Connor
wrote.
"If this case were to rest on such a high
level of generality, there would be little
check on the authorities' ability to
construct roadblocks for almost any
conceivable law enforcement purpose,"
the opinion said.
During oral arguments in October,
several justices seemed troubled by the
notion that by unwittingly driving into
the checkpoint, a motorist is open to a
criminal investigation that presumably
would not have happened otherwise.
Others questioned whether the use of
drug-sniffing dogs was heavy-handed.
The dogs were led around the car's
exterior at every stop.
The case is one of several the court has
taken recently that examine the limits of
police powers to hunt for drugs.
-The court heard arguments in the case
of a man detained by police outside his
home for about two hours while officers
got a search warrant for drugs. In that
case, justices seemed to indicate by their
questions that they saw little wrong with
the police approach.
-The justices will also consider a case
involving a man arrested for growing
marijuana after police outside the home
monitored heat generated by grow lamps
in his garage.
-In 1999, the court ruled that
immigration officials violated bus
passengers' privacy rights by squeezing
the luggage in overhead racks in a search
for drugs.
In the Indianapolis case, lawyers for the
city said catching drug criminals was the
primary aim of the roadblocks set up in
the summer of 1998. The city conceded
the roadblocks detained far more
innocent motorists than criminals, but
contended the checks were a quick and
efficient way to hunt for illegal drugs
and that the severity of the drug problem
in some areas justified the searches.
While agreeing that society would no
doubt be safer without illegal drugs,
O'Connor said "the gravity of the threat
alone" cannot determine whether the
program was constitutional.
Similarly, the majority rejected the idea
that the checkpoints could also help
catch drunks and drivers without valid
licenses or registrations.
Under that justification, O'Connor wrote,
"authorities would be able to establish
checkpoints for virtually any purpose so
long as they also included a license or
sobriety check."
191
The city conducted six roadblocks over
four months in 1998 before the practice
was challenged in federal court.
Police stopped 1,161 cars and trucks at
random and made 104 arrests, 55 of
them on drug charges.
Several other cities have used similar
checkpoints, but others held off to see
how the Supreme Court would rule on
Indianapolis.
The case is Indianapolis v. Edmond, 99-
1030.
Copyright D 2001 The Associated Press.
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Last Tenn:
UNITED STATES of America, Petitioner
V.
OAKLAND CANNIBIS BUYERS' COOPERATIVE, et al. Respondents
No. 00- 151
Supreme Court of the United States
Decided May 14, 2001
Up in Smoke
Supreme Court Snuffs Medical Marijuana Clubs,
But Users Vow to Keep on Toking
Vilage Voice
Tuesday, May 22, 2001
Sharon Lerner
For as many as 100,000 people who go
through buyers' clubs to acquire the
cannabis that eases the effects of
devastating illnesses including AIDS,
cancer, and multiple sclerosis, Mondays
unanimous U.S. Supreme Court ruling
against medical marijuana was a harsh
blow. * Voting 8-0, the court ruled
against the Oakland Cannabis Buyers'
Cooperative, a California club that
distributed marijuana for medical
purposes. Justice Clarence Thomas, who
wrote the decision, declared that
"marijuana has no medical benefits
worthy of an excon" from its status as an
illegal drug under the federal Controlled
Substances Act. * As a result, federal
drug enforcement agents and U.S.
attorneys now have the power to shut
down other buyers' clubs. There are
some three dozen of them nationwide,
according to Keith Stroup, executive
director of the National
Organization to Reform Marijuana Laws
NORML). Still, it's not clear exactly how
the decision will affect patients whose
medication has long been stuck in legal
limbo. Though the Supreme Court
decision is irreversible, some advocates
are predicting that, practically speaking,
medical marijuana users will continue to
smoke on the hazy outskirts of the law.
For one thing, most medical marijuana
users will be unaffected since they don't
get their pot at buyers' clubs. "They grow
it themselves or go to the corner and buy
it like everyone else does," says Dan
Abrahamson, director of legal affairs for
Lindesmith Center, a nonprofit
organization that promotes liberal drug
policies.
And even while marijuana has been illegal
under federal law, nine states have
exempted patients from prosecution for
having or smoking pot if a doctor
recommends they use it. The decision
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didn't directly address these state
protections, including eight voter
initiatives and a Hawaiian law that
protects medical marijuana users. Most
medical marijuana arrests are made by
state authorities, and experts doubt the
court decision will lead to a federal
crackdown.
"We know that this is one of the lowest
priorities for the feds in the war on
drugs," says Abrahamson. "History shows
that that's not how they're going to focus
their limited resources."
In California, where state law allows
patients to grow and use marijuana if a
doctor recommends it, none of the six
clubs involved in the initial litigation that
ultimately made it into Monday's decision
is still selling marijuana, and only one of
more than 30 clubs once operating
statewide is still operating as it was,
according to Dave Fratello, spokesman
for the advocacy group Americans for
Medical Rights.
Fratello emphasizes that patients are still
finding the drug, however. "The federal
case never stopped medical marijuana
distribution, it simply drove it
underground," he says. Now it takes a
couple of phone calls to find marijuana
that could have been obtained from the
storefronts." Fratello also complains that
patients buying on the street face "ripoffs,
fakes, and price-gouging."
The roughly seven buyers' clubs in New
York Cty operate in a similar gray area.
One club, the Patients' Cooperative, has
registered almost 1000 members and
regularly provides marijuana to some 200
people with AIDS, glaucoma, or MS,
according to the group's coordinator,
Kenneth Toglia. Though the state makes
no special protection for medical
marijuana users, the club asks its members
to provide proof of diagnosis from their
doctors in exchange for identification
cards, which, according to Toglia, have
helped them escape arrest.
In the two years the club has been in
existence, between 40 and 50 people have
had run-ins with police, according to
Toglia, and about half have been released
with their pot after showing their
identification cards and explaining that
they were using it for medical purposes. A
few, including a blind man who suffers
from glaucoma, were sent to jail.
The medical benefits of pot are worth
such a price, supporters say. It can combat
not only the pain of disease but also the
many side effects of medications,
according to John Sheridan, a member
and past president of New York Cannabis
Care. Sheridan, who has AIDS-related
wasting syndrome, says he smokes
marijuana to restore his appetite, which
has been diminished by the regimen of
antiviral drugs he takes. Pot has helped
Sheridan, who is 5 foot 8, bring his weight
up to 143 from a mere 111 when he was
at his sickest in 1994.
Though some people take Marino-one of
the chemicals found in pot-in a legal,
prescription form, others say the pill is
inferior to the plant alternative, in part
because its effect is harder to moderate.
"It would usually come on so strong that I
would be too hungry to eat," Sheridan
says of Marinol. "When I was suddenly so
hungry, I'd throw up everything I ate."
With pot, Sheridan has developed a
routine of taking his antiviral pills,
smoking part of a joint, and then having a
small meal within 20 minutes. For the
AIDS patient, no law or Supreme Court
decision will change how he chooses to
treat this discomfort. A night in jail
seems a small worry "when I've already
been threatened by the grim reaper," says
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Sheridan.
The Oakland case has more significance
to lawmakers, who have been struggling
to separate medical marijuana from other
drugs for years. "The decision is a
frightening one beyond marijuana,' says
Manhattan-based assemblyman Dick
Gottfried, the sponsor of state legislation
that would allow doctors to prescribe
marijuana (it has languished for the past
four years). "I think when Congress is
playing doctor, they are stepping into the
constitutional right of privacy."
Gottfried also notes that the Food and
Drug Administration approved one of the
active chemicals in pot as safe and
effective when it's marketed by a drug
company as Marinol. "For the Supreme
Court to say that they cannot review a
congressional determination that the same
ingredient when inhaled is criminal is
utterly irrational," says Gottfried.
Perhaps most frustrating to medical
marijuana advocates was the court's
refusal to reconsider marijuana's
designation as a "schedule one" drug, for
which there are no exceptions. "The court
seems to say that if Congress makes a
medical decision, that's the end of the
discussion,' says Gottfried. Pending
federal legislation sponsored by
Massachusetts congressman Barney Frank
would reclassify pot as a "schedule two"
drug, making it legal to prescribe, as some
opiates and barbiturates already are.
In the meantime, medical marijuana
advocates are doing what little they can.
Even if they won't be providing pot,
"[Bjuyers' clubs will continue to provide
ID cards," says NORML's Stroup. And
most patients will continue to get their pot
illegally, whether from small cooperatives
or dealers on the corner.
It's an arrangement that many medical
marijuana users find sorely inadequate.
"Eventually, the US. is going to have to
make some kind of exception for medical
marijuana," says the Patients'
Cooperative's Toglia. "Until then, it'll be
like the French resistance-a lot of people
risking their lives to keep others alive."
Copyright 0 2001 Bell & Howell
Information and Learning Company.
All rights reserved. Copyright C) 2001
Village Voice.
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00-8727 McCarver v. North Carolina
Ruling Below (N.C., 2/27/01)
Stay of execution entered by trial court, barring execution of defendant with IQ of 67 during
pendency of legislative proposal to ban execution of mentally retarded persons, is
inconsistent with North Carolina law, and therefore emergency petition for writs of
prohibition and certiorari filed by state are hereby allowed and stay of execution entered by
trial court dissolved.
Question Presented: Does significant objective evidence demonstrate that national
standards have evolved such that executing mentally retarded man would violate Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment)
Ernest P. McCARVER, Petitioner,
V.
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Respondent
In the General Court of Justice
Superior Court Division
Decided February 27, 2001
STANBACK Jr., Presiding Judge;
THIS CAUSE, coming on to be heard
and being heard on defendant's
application for writ of habeas corpus
pursuant to chapter 17 of the North
Carolina General Statutes, before the
Honorable A. Leon Stanback, Jr., Superior
Court Judge, presiding at the February 26,
2001, Session of Chatham County
superior Court; and after carefully
reviewing the evidence and hearing the
arguments from counsel, the court makes
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. A bill pending before the North
Carolina General Assembly would ban the
execution of the mentally retarded. There
is reasonable likelihood and probable
cause to believe that this bill will become
law and will apply to the defendant. This
would rob the court of jurisdiction to
execute defendant.
2. Defendant has been tested as having an
IQ of 67, which falls within the range of
mental retardation, and within the
parameters of the proposed bill.
3. No court has determined whether
defendant is or is not mentally retarded.
4. Defendant would be irreparably harmed
if executed prior to a final determination
of the pending legislation.
5. The State will suffer little or no harm if
a stay of execution is granted.
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BASED ON THE FOREGOING
FINDINGS OF FACIS, THE COURT
MAKES THE FOLLOWING
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the
parties and this action.
2. Legislation pending before the North
Carolina General Assembly would ban the
execution of the mentally retarded. There
is a reasonable likelihood and probable
cause to believe that this bill will become
law and apply to the defendant. This
would rob the court of jurisdiction to
execute defendant.
3. Defendant would be irreparably harmed
if executed prior to a final determination
of the pending legislation.
4. The State will suffer little or no harm if
a stay of execution is granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that
defendant's application for writ of habeas
corpus is GRANTED as follows: A stay
of execution is entered preventing the
State of north carolina from executing
defendant until the earliest of the
following:
a. The adjournment of the 2001 Session
of the North Carolina General Assembly
without action being taken on legislation
to prevent the execution of the mentally
retarded;
b. The General Assembly rejects
legislation banning the execution of the
mentally retarded or said bill is approved
by the General Assembly but vetoed by
the Governor, and not overridden by the
General Assembly,
c. Legislation banning the execution of the
mentally retarded is passed into law, and it
is determined by a court of competent
jurisdiction that said bill does not apply to
defendant.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that
defendant's application for writ of habeas
corpus with regard to the age mitigator
issue and the Appwdi/Jorms issue as set
out in defendant's application is
DENIED.
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STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
V.
ERNEST PAUL McCARVER
Supreme Court of North Carolina
Decided February 27, 2001
ORDER
Upon consideration of the Emergency
Petition for Writs of Prohibition and
Certiorari filed by the State of North
Carolina and the Cross-Petition for Writ
of Certiorari filed by Petitioner, Ernest
Paul McCarver, the following order is
entered;
It appears to the Court, based upon the
Petitions filed by the State and Petitioner,
that the stay of execution entered by the
trial court in this matter on 27 February
2001 is inconsistent with North Carolina
law.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED
(i) that the Emergency Petition for Writs
of Prohibition and Certiorari filed by the
State of North Carolina on 27 February
2001 are hereby allowed and the Cross-
Petition for Writ of Certiorari filed by
Petitioner on 27 February 2001 is hereby
denied, and (ii) that the stay of execution
entered by the trial court on 27 February
2001 is hereby dissolved.
By order of this Court in Conference, this
the 27'day of February, 2001.
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Court to Review Death Penalty Cases
Associated Prss
Monday, March 26, 2001
Laurie Asseo
The Supreme Court rejoined the heated
national debate over the death penalty
Monday, announcing it will decide whether
the Constitution's ban on "cruel and unusual
punishment" bars execution of mentally
retarded people.
The justices said they will hear an appeal by
North Carolina death-row inmate Ernest
McCarver, whose lawyers say he is retarded.
The justices halted his execution early this
month just hours before he was to have been
put to death.
The justices decided in 1989 the Constitution
allows execution of mentally retarded killers.
McCarver's lawyers say Americans' views on
the issue - what legal arguments refer to as
"standards of decency" - have changed since
then.
"There has been a substantial change in
American society," his lawyers wrote in his
appeal. "The penalty of death is plainly cruel
when imposed on those whose culpability is
lessened by their inability to reason."
The Constitution's Eighth Amendment bans
"cruel and unusual punishments." the
question, McCarver's lawyers contend, is
whether a punishment offends contemporary
standards.
Prosecutors said considerable evidence
showed that Mc Carver was not mentally
retarded, but they added that even if he was,
his execution would not violate the
Constitution.
North Carolina Gov. Mike Easley denied
clemency, saying McCarver planned the 1987
stabbing and choking death of a co-worker,
motivated by revenge.
This month, the justices blocked the
execution of another man said by his lawyers
to be borderline retarded. Antonio
Richardson had been scheduled to be put to
death March 7 in Missouri.
The court also plans to hear arguments
Tuesday in another case involving a death-row
inmate whose lawyers say he is mentally
retarded.
The case involving Johnny Paul Penry of
Texas does not ask whether the Constitution
prohibits executing the mentally retarded.
Instead, Penry's lawyers say jurors who
sentenced him to death for murder did not
have the chance to properly consider his
mental capacity.
It was not immediately clear how the justices'
decision to hear McCarver's case this fall will
affect the Texas appeal. But Penry's lawyer,
Robert S. Smith, said that if the Supreme
Court decides the mentally retarded cannot be
executed, "I would hope and believe that that
decision will be applied to Penry."
The Supreme Court used Penry's case in 1989
to rule that the Constitution allows the
execution of mentally retarded killers.
There have been 702 inmates executed
nationwide since a Supreme Court-ordered
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moratorium ended in 1977. Of those, about
35 had showed evidence of mental retardation
in tests, said Richard Dieter of the Death
Penalty Information center, a group critical of
how capital punishment is administered.
The 1972 ruling that halted executions
nationwide said existing laws made capital
punishment too arbitrary. Executions
resumed in 1977, and during recent years the
nation's highest court and Congress have
moved to limit and speed up death row
inmates' appeals.
Recent debate over the death penalty has
centered on arguments that some death-row
inmates are innocent. Last year, Republican
Gov. George Ryan of Illinois imposed a
moratorium on capital punishment in his state
after 13 inmates were exonerated.
McCarver, 40, was convicted of the January
1987 stabbing and choking death of
Woodrow Hartley, a 71-year-old worker at the
Concord, N. C, cafeteria where McCarver
had worked.
The inmates lawyers say he has the mind of a
10-year old and reads at third-grade level. The
Supreme Court halted his execution on March
1 after he had been served his last meal.
In denying clemency, Easley said McCarver
was competent enough to gain employment
and earn driving privileges, and no court had
found him incompetent.
Thirteen capital-punishment states prohibit
execution of the mentally retarded: Arkansas,
Colorado, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas,
Kentucky, Maryland, Nebraska, New Mexico,
South Dakota, Tennessee, Washington and
New York, except for murder by a prisoner.
Another 12 states do not have capital
punishment. Those states, combined with the
federal government and District of Columbia,
mean that most U.S. jurisdictions bar such
executions, McCarver's lawyers said.
McCarver's most recent IQ test, arranged by
the defense team, put his score at 67, but his
IQ was measured at between 70 and 80 before
his 1988 trial.
Kent Scheidegger of the Criminal Justice
Legal Foundation said he believed most
people would oppose executing the mentally
retarded, but he believed it was preferable to
act through legislation rather than a court
ruling.
Diann Rust-Tiemey, director of the American
Civil Liberties Union capital punishment
project, said, "The time is ripe for the court to
take a look at this. We're hopeful that the
court will see that the public's views on this
have changed, and that under evolving
standards of decency it is untenable to execute
the mentally retarded."
The case is Mc Carver v. North Carolina, 00-
8727.
Copyright @ The Associated Press.
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A Dismal Record on Executing the Retarded
The New York Times
Thursday, June 14, 2001
Hamid Hongfu Kob
How does the Bush administration view
executing people with mental retardation?
When asked this week, President Bush said:
"We should never execute anybody who is
mentally retarded. And our court system
protects people who don't understand the
nature of the crime they've committed nor the
punishment they are about to receive."
His answer surprised many, since as governor
of Texas he declined to halt the execution of a
mentally retarded man and opposed a flat
legislative ban on this sort of execution. When
asked to clarify his meaning, a spokeswoman
said: "This is not a change of policy. He's
talking about the standards they had in
Texas."
But this clarification makes no sense. The
standards applied in Texas are designed to
protect the mentally ill, not the mentally
retarded. In Texas and many other states,
people with I.Q.'s of less than 70 and low
adaptive skills can and have been sentenced to
death. A mentally retarded defendant can be
found "not insane" and hence be deemed
competent to stand trial and be convicted
because he arguably understood the difference
between right and wrong, as a child might
understand that difference. Such a defendant
can be executed without ever grasping the
most basic legal principles that decided his
fate. The United States Supreme Court will
soon decide in the case of Ernest McCarver, a
North Carolina death row inmate with the
mind of a 10-year-old, whether to require a
categorical ban against executing people with
mental retardation.
The McCarver case arises at a time when
public views are rapidly shifting. In 1989, the
last time the court considered the issue, only
two states banned execution of people with
mental retardation. Today, 15 states and the
federal government ban such executions and
12 others and the District of Columbia have
abolished the death penalty. On Tuesday,
Gov. Jeb Bush of Florida signed a bill
prohibiting execution of mentally retarded
prisoners. Legislatures in three other states
have approved such bills.
Internationally, only Kyrgzstan is also known
regularly to execute people with mental
retardation. Nine prominent former American
diplomats recently told the Supreme Court in
the McCarver case that such executions create
diplomatic friction, tarnish America's image as
a human rights leader and harm broader
American foreign policy interests.
At this pivotal moment, President Bush
cannot simply dodge the question by
obfuscation. he justifies capital punishment as
a deterrent to crime. But what deterrent effect
does it have on individuals with childlike
minds?
President Bush must honestly acknowledge
that under current law those with mental
retardation are regularly executed. if he
sincerely believes that "we should never
execute anybody who is mentally retarded,"
he should make it administration policy by
instructing his solicitor general, Theodore
Olson, to file a friend-of-the-court brief with
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the Supreme Court to oppose Mr. McCarver's
execution. He should follow the lead of his
brother Jeb Bush on this issue and encourage
the governors of Texas, Connecticut and
Missouri to sign the bills now on their desks
banning execution of mentally retarded
people.
Only a small portion of the condemned in this
country are mentally retarded. The president
would show real compassion and principle by
protecting this population from a practice
considered barbaric in the rest of the civilized
world.
Copyright c The New York Tirs Company
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High Court to Review Executing Retarded;
Decision May Reflect Changes in State Laws on Mentally Disabled
The Washington Post
Tuesday, March 27, 2001
Charles Lane
The Supreme Court announced yesterday that
it will decide whether the Constitution permits
the execution of mentally retarded criminals,
raising the possibility of one of the most
significant reversals in the law on capital
punishment since the reinstitution of the
death penalty 25 years ago.
The court had apparently settled the issue of
executing mentally retarded offenders in 1989,
when it decided by a 5 to 4 vote that the
practice did not necessarily violate the
Constitution's ban on "cruel and unusual"
punishment.
But yesterday the justices said they would
reconsider that ruling in the case of Ernest
McCarver, a convicted murderer on North
carolina's death-row whose attorneys say he
has an IQ of 67.
The court's move took death penalty
opponents by surprise. They have been
waging a national campaign against executions
of the mentally retarded, but had assumed
that the justices would adhere to their normal
aversion to revisiting relatively recent
precedent.
"There's no guarantee that they will change"
the 1989 ruling, said George Kendall of the
NAACP Legal Defense Fund in New York.
"But it at least shows that there has been
enough change in the circumstances to
warrant a reexamination." It takes the votes of
four justices to agree to hear a case, but five
to decide one.
Because of the unique legal issues involved,
McCarver's case provides the first signal that
the court's view of capital punishment may be
evolving to take account of a greater public
concern with how capital punishment is
administered.
The court's 1989 decision was largely based
on the fact that only two states at the time
banned executions of mentally retarded
criminals. This, the court said, was not
enough evidence of a "national consensus"
that the practice violated the country's
"standards of decency."
Today, however, 12 of the 37 states that allow
the death penalty have banned executions of
mentally retarded people. When combined
with the 13 states that do not permit capital
punishment, half the states now forbid
executions of the mentally retarded. Federal
law also forbids executing the mentally
retarded in federal cases. (The District of
Columbia has no death penalty.)
In their appeal to the court, McCarver's
lawyers said these developments show that
the countrys values have changed enough to
warrant abolishing capital punishment for the
mentally retarded.
"I was hopeful because the court in 1989 was
sharply divided, and the landscape has
changed since then," said Seth Cohen, one of
McCarver's attorneys.
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The court's decision to consider McCarver's
appeal was announced as the justices prepared
to hear arguments today in a case involving
Johnny Paul Penry, the mentally retarded
Texas death row inmate whose previous
appeal gave rise to the 1989 ruling.
Despite rejecting the ban on executing
mentally retarded offenders, the court ordered
a new trial for Penry because it said Texas law
did not permit his jury to adequately consider
whether his retardation was a reason to
sentence him to life in prison instead of death.
Retried, convicted and sentenced to death in
1990, Penry now says that flawed jury
instructions in the second proceeding again
prevented jurors from giving him a fair
chance at a life sentence.
While Penry's latest appeal is a rallying point
for foes of the death penalty, it presents the
justices with legal issues that affect only Penry
and perhaps a few other death row inmates in
Texas.
In light of the court's decision to hear
McCarver's appeal, however, the Penry case
takes on new significance as a source of clues
to the possible evolution of the court on the
broader issue of executing mentally retarded
offenders.
Last year, when they were considering how to
frame their Supreme Court case, Penry's
lawyers debated whether to ask the court to
consider renewed constitutional challenge to
the execution of the mentally retarded. After
consulting with experts in death penalty
litigation, the lawyers concluded that the
justices were not likely to consider such an
argument, which the attorneys has pressed
unsuccessfully in lower courts.
As the lawyers were aware, on Aug. 7, the
Supreme Court had declined o halt the
execution of a murderer in Texas, Oliver
David Cruz, who also said he was mentally
retarded and had raised procedural issues
similar to Penry's. Three of the court's liberal
members, Justices John Paul Stevens, Ruth
Bader Ginsberg and Stephen G. Breyer,
publicly dissented from that decision.
"It's possible we were wrong," said Robert
Smith, Penry's attorney. "But it was a tactical
judgment."
Thirty-five mentally retarded people - -
defined as those with an IQ of 70 or lower - -
have been executed since the Supreme Court
permitted the resumption of the death penalty
in 1976, according to the Death Penalty
Information Center, a Washington nonprofit
group that opposes capital punishment.
Human Rights Watch, another anti-death
penalty organization, estimates that there are
200 to 300 mentally retarded inmates among
the death row population of more than 3,700
convicted murderers.
Proponents of a ban on executing the
mentally retarded argue that the practice
serves neither to punish nor deter crime. The
mentally retarded lack the ability to rationally
weigh the consequences of their actions,
opponents say, and executing these 'least
culpable" offenders amounts to "cruel and
unusual" punishment prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution, and
by international law.
"The United States may be the only
constitutional democracy whose law expressly
permits the execution of persons whose
cognitive development has been limited by
mental retardation and that carries out such
executions," a March 20 report by Human
Rights Watch said.
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Many prosecutors and victims' rights groups
oppose a ban, arguing that even people of
very low intelligence can often tell right from
wrong, and that the concept of mental
retardation itself is elastic. Better to let juries
and courts determine defendants culpability
on an individual basis, they argue.
"There are not a lot of criminals who are
mentally retarded," said Kent Schiedegger,
legal director of the Criminal Justice Legal
Foundation, which has filed a friend-of-the
court brief on behalf of the state of Texas in
Penry's case. "On the other hand, there is a
very large number who might claim it."
Indeed, Emest McCarver's case illustrates
how difficult it can be to come up with a
universally accepted definition. McCarver was
26 years old on Jan. 2, 1987, when he stabbed
71-year-old Woodrow F. Hartley to death at a
cafeteria in Concord, N.C
Arguing against McCarver's Supreme Court
appeal, attorneys for North Carolina noted
that a defense-appointed psychiatrist testified
at McCarver's 1992 sentencing trial that he
had scored 74 on an IQ test before the trial,
not quite low enough to qualify him as
mentally retarded.
Last February, however, as McCarver's
attorneys were working on appeals to spare
him from execution, they brought in a
psychologist to administer a new intelligence
test in prison. McCarver scored 67.
If history is any guide, Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor will be the pivotal figure in the
court's decision on McCarver's case.
The 1989 Supreme Court case, now known as
Penry I, was closely fought in a court divided
between formidable death penalty foes, such
as the late Justices William Brennan and
Thurgood Marshall, and equally determined
supporters of capital punishment, such as
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justice
Antonin Scalia. Rehnquist and Scalia are still
on the court today.
According to a Jan. 13, 1989 memorandum to
Rehnquist from O'Connor included in
Marshall's papers at the Library of Congress,
O'Connor held the deciding vote in the case
and took it upon herself to fashion an opinion
for the court.
In the opinion, O'Connor wrestled with the
question of how to define mental retardation
and how to attribute culpability to mentally
retarded defendants.
O'Connor dealt with these concerns in a
portion of her opinion which held that state
law must give juries a chance to make a
"reasoned moral response" to evidence of
mental retardation. This section - - the basis
for giving Penry a new trial - - was joined by
Brennan, Marshall, the late Justice Harry
Blackmun and Stevens, who is still on the
court.
However, O'Connor concluded that, "on the
present record," it was not clear that all
mentally retarded people lacked the reasoning
ability ever to warrant capital punishment,
because they could make use of an insanity
defense.
The portion of her opinion that held there
was insufficient evidence of a "national
consensus" to warrant abolishing executions
of the mentally retarded was joined by
Rehnquist, Scalia, and Justice Anthony M.
Kennedy and Byron White, who has since
retired.
O'Connor's opinion said a national consensus
against capital punishment for mentally
retarded criminals "may ultimately find
expression in legislation, which is an objective
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indicator of contemporary values upon which
we rely."
Scheduled executions for McCarver and
Antonio Richardson, a convicted murderer
from Missouri who says he is retarded, were
stayed by the court in the first week of March.
The court will hear McCarver v. North
Carolina, case no. 00-8727, next fall, and a
decision is expected byJuly 2002.
Copyright @ The Washington Pcat
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00-957 Kansas v. Crane
Ruling Below (In m Crare, Kan., 269 Kan. 578, 7 P.3d 285, 67 Crim. L. Rep. 643):
Civil commitment under Kansas Sexually Violent Predator Act, Kan. Stat. Ann. 59-29a0 1 et
seq., violates 14' Amendment's due process clause in absence of finding that offender
suffers from volitional impairment rendering him dangerous beyond his control.
Question Presented: Does 14' Amendment's due process clause require state to prove that
sexually violent predator "cannot control" his criminal sexual behavior before state can
civilly commit him for residential care and treatment?
In re CRANE
Supreme Court of Kansas
Decided July 14, 2000
ALLEGRUCC, Justice:
Michael T. Crane appeals from the district
court's order committing him to custody
under the Sexually Violent Predator Act,
K.SA 59-29a01 et seq. (Act).
In State v Crare; 260 Kan. 208, 918 P.2d
1256 (1996), this court affirmed Michael
Crane's conviction of lewd and lascivious
behavior for exposing himself to a tanning
salon attendant on January 6, 1993. His
convictions of attempted aggravated
criminal sodomy, attempted rape, and
kidnapping were reversed. They arose out
of an incident in a video store that took
place approximately 30 minutes after the
tanning salon incident.
The aggravated sexual battery conviction
that supplied the prior conduct element of
Crane's sexual predator determination
arose out of the video store incident. In
that instance, Crane waited until he was
the only customer in a video store and
then grabbed the clerk from behind. With
his genitals exposed, he lifted and pushed
her and squeezed her neck with his hands.
Crane three times ordered her to perform
oral sex and said he was going to rape her.
The attack ended when Crane suddenly
stopped and ran out of the store.
Although the kidnapping charge could not
be renewed, other charges arising from
this incident were refiled. Pursuant to a
plea agreement, Crane pled guilty to one
count of aggravated sexual battery, a class
D felony.
The present action was initiated when the
State filed a petition in the district court
seeking to have Crane evaluated and
adjudicated a sexually violent predator. At
the commitment trial, the State presented
evidence of Crane's inappropriate sexual
behavior on several occasions as well as
the testimony of mental health
professionals.
Psychologist Douglas H-ippe evaluated
Crane in 1994 and reviewed the mental
health records subsequently compiled for
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Crane. He concluded that Crane suffers
from antisocial personality disorder. Of
the seven criteria listed in the American
Psychiatric Association's Diagnostic and
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(4th ed. 1994) (DSM-IV) for antisocial
personality disorder, Crane consistently
exhibits six, in Hippe's view. Crane also
suffers from exhibitionism, which is a
separate disorder. According to Hippe,
exhibitionism alone would not be a
sufficient basis for finding that a person
was a sexual predator. Crane, in his
opinion, is a sexual predator due to his
combination of antisocial personality
disorder and exhibitionism. He cited the
increasing frequency of incidents
involving Crane, increasing intensity of
the incidents, Crane's increasing disregard
for the rights of others, and his increasing
daring and aggressiveness.
Psychologist Robert Huerter tested and
interviewed Crane in 1993 with regard to
Crane's claiming to have been in a
blackout state during the video store
incident. He concluded that Crane had
not experienced blackout.
Psychiatrist Leonardo Mabugat testified
that Crane suffers from antisocial
personality disorder, "a pervasive pattern
of disregard for and violation of the rights
of others," which usually starts in or
around adolescence.
The victim of the video store incident
testified that the prosecuting attorney had
talked with her about the State's entering
into a plea agreement with Crane. The
victim had been upset because she did not
think that Crane would be serving enough
tune.
At the commitment trial, the victim
expressed her disappointment in the
course Crane's prosecution had taken. The
prosecutor drew out her dissatisfaction by
asking, "So would it be fair to say that for
a crime that this Court gave a 35- to-life
sentence to Mr. Crane, he only served a
little over four years?" And he followed
up on her affirmative response with "[aind
understandably you're very upset about
how the system treated you in this case,
right?" "Yes, very," she answered. The
victim had been told by the State that the
kidnapping charge could not be refiled
against Crane on account of a technicality.
In this regard, the prosecutor had
suggested to her that obtaining a guilty
plea "was the best way to go in order to
be able to go down the line" and use the
option of the Act. The victim agreed to
the plea bargain because she believed "it
was the only way to make sure that it
didn't end there." The victim testified, "I
was not aware that there was an option of
going to trial and going through this or
agreeing to the plea and then using the
Sexual Predator Act. As I was--as I
understood, this was the only option, but
if we can get a--some kind of a conviction,
then we can use this option later down the
road to make sure he stays off the street."
Crane raises several issues on appeal;
however, the controlling issue is whether
it is constitutionally permissible to commit
Crane as a sexual predator absent a
showing that he was unable to control his
dangerous behavior. To answer that
question, we must revisit Karmas v
Henrids, 521 U.S. 346, 117 S.Ct. 2072,
138 L.Ed.2d 501 (1997). The majority
opinion, written by Justice Thomas,
controls the result in this case. Crane
contends that the trial court erred in ruling
that the Supreme Court's holding in
Herriks does not require a showing of a
volitional impairment that prevents him
from controlling his dangerous behavior
when the respondent's mental disorder is
a personality disorder. * * *
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On August 3, 1998, the district court held
as a matter of law "that even though the
State's expert witnesses might agree that
Respondent's mental disorder does not
impair his volitional control to the degree
he cannot control his dangerous behavior,
that K.S.A. 59-29a01 et seq. does not
specify such a required element to be
proven.
Accordingly, the jury was instructed that
in order to establish that Crane is a
sexually violent predator, the State had to
prove (1) that Crane had been convicted
of aggravated sexual battery and (2) that
he "suffers from a mental abnormality or
personality disorder which makes the
respondent likely to engage in future
predatory acts of sexual violence, if not
confined in a secure facility." "Likely" was
defined as "more probable to occur than
not to occur." "Mental abnormality' was
defined for the jury in accordance with
K.SA1999 Supp. 59-29a02(b) as a
"condition affecting the emotional or
volitional capacity which predisposes a
person to commit sexually violent
offenses in a degree constituting such
person a menace to the health and safety
of others." "Personality disorder" was
defined for the jury as a "condition
recognized by the .. [DSM IV], and
includes antisocial personality disorder."
Kansas' statutory scheme for commitment
of sexually violent predators does not
expressly prohibit confinement absent a
finding of uncontrollable dangerousness.
In fact, a fair reading of the statute gives
the opposite impression.
The Act provides for commitment of
persons determined to be sexually violent
predators. A "sexually violent predator" is
defined in the statute as "any person who
has been convicted of or charged with a
sexually violent offense and who suffers
from a mental abnormality or personality
disorder which makes the person likely to
engage in repeat acts of sexual violence."
K.S.A.1999 Supp. 59-29a02(a). "Mental
abnormality" is defined as a "condition
affecting the emotional or volitional
capacity which predisposes the person to
commit sexually violent offenses in a
degree constituting such person a menace
to the health and safety of others."
K.S.A.1999 Supp. 59-29a02(b). The
phrase "likely to engage in repeat acts of
sexual violence" "means the person's
propensity to commit acts of sexual
violence is of such a degree as to pose a
menace to the health and safety of
others." K.S.A.1999 Supp. 59-29a02(c).
The legislature specified that a person
subject to commitment, in addition to
having some history of a sexual offense or
offenses, must be likely to engage in
future, dangerous sexual behavior on
account of a mental condition. With
regard to the mental condition, the
legislature provided that it could affect
either emotional capacity or volitional
capacity. Volitional capacity is the capacity
to exercise choice or will; a condition
affecting the capacity to exercise choice or
will in this context would be one that
adversely affected the capacity, thereby
rendering the person unable to control his
or her behavior. The legislature identified
emotional capacity as an alternative faculty
that could be affected by the condition.
Logic would seem to dictate that the
alternative to a capacity involving the
exercise of will is one in which the
exercise of will is not at issue. Thus, a
condition affecting that faculty would not
necessarily remove the person's ability to
control his or her behavior. It seems,
therefore, that the result of the
legislature's identifying emotional capacity
as well as volitional capacity in the
definition of mental abnormality was to
209
include a source of bad behavior other
than inability to control behavior.
The legislature also provided an
alternative to a mental abnormality and
that is a personality disorder. However,
there is no definition of personality
disorder in the Act. Thus, there is no
express requirement of a finding of
inability to control behavior in a
personality disorder. Nor is there anything
implied by the absence of a definition of
personality disorder that would inject the
requirement.
There also is no pattern definition of
personality disorder. The Notes on Use of
PIK Crim.3d 57.41 state that a pattern
definition is not possible because there are
too many conditions recognized by the
American Psychiatric Association as
constituting personality disorders.
"Notwithstanding, the Committee does
recommend that the trial judge fashion an
appropriate definitional instruction based
upon the specific diagnosis stated in the
American Psychiatric Association
manual." In the present case, the trial
judge instructed the jury that "personality
disorder" is a "condition recognized by
the ... [DSM IV], and includes antisocial
personality disorder."
At trial, Dr. Mabugat testified for the State
that Crane suffered from the mental
abnormality of exhibitionism and from
the personality disorder called antisocial
personality disorder. With respect to
antisocial personality disorder, Dr.
Mabugat testified that Crane displayed a
pervasive pattern of disregard for and
violation of the rights of others that
included the following behavior
failure to conform to social norms with
respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by
repeatedly performing acts that are
grounds for arrest;
impulsivity or failure to plan ahead;
irritability and aggressiveness, as indicated
by repeated physical fights or assaults.
Dr. Mabugat believed that Crane's
behavior was a combination of willful and
uncontrollable behavior. Thus, if a
volitional impairment were required for
commitment under the Act, there was
evidence of some inability on Crane's part
to control his behavior.
* * *Stated more generally, Crane's
understanding is that the Supreme Court
read a volitional impairment requirement
into the Act as a condition of its
constitutionality.* **
In summary, the Supreme Court opinion
in Hddris does not seem to include
consideration of willful behavior. The
Act's definition of mental abnormality
seems to include behavior that the
respondent could control, and the Act is
silent with regard to personality disorder.
Crane's position is that the Supreme Court
read a requirement of inability to control
behavior into the Act in order to uphold
its constitutionality. Thus, he argues that
the Act cannot be applied to him in the
absence of a finding that he was unable to
control his behavior. We find merit in the
defendant's argument.
A fair reading of the majority opinion in
Hmrides leads us to the inescapable
conclusion that commitment under the
Act is unconstitutional absent a finding
that the defendant cannot control his
dangerous behavior. To conclude
otherwise would require that we ignore
the plain language of the majority opinion
in Hmcbias. Justice Thomas, speaking for
the majority, stated that to be
constitutional, a civil commitment must
limit involuntary confinement to those
"who suffer from a volitional impairment
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rendering them dangerous beyond their
control." 521 U.S. at 358, 117 S.Ct. 2072.
He noted that the Kansas Act set forth
criteria to make such a finding by linking
future dangerousness to a "mental
abnormality" or " personality disorder"
that "makes it difficult, if not impossible,"
to control such behavior. 521 U.S. at 358,
117 S.Ct. 2072. * * *
However, in the present case, Crane
suffers from a "personality disorder,"
which by definition does not include a
volitional impairment. As noted, there was
some evidence to that effect. Within the
standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt, however, such evidence does not
seem adequate. K.S.A.1999 Supp. 59-
29a07(a). Its sufficiency is a question for
the jury, which was not instructed to make
a finding as to Crane's inability to control
his behavior. Since we hold that such a
finding is required, the failure to so
instruct the jury was error and requires
that we reverse and remand for a new
trial.
Crane also argues that the State's
application of the Act violates the
constitutional prohibitions of ex post
facto laws and double jeopardy. The
element of inability to control behavior
also figures in the Supreme Court's
consideration of Hendricks' ex post facto
and double jeopardy claims. There, it is a
part of the reasoning that supports the
conclusion that the Kansas Act establishes
civil rather than criminal proceedings. 521
U.S. at 360-69, 117 S.Ct. 2072. Because
the Ex Post Facto and Double Jeopardy
Clauses pertain exclusively to penal
statutes, the Supreme Court concluded
that the Kansas Act "runs afoul" of
neither. 521 U.S. at 371, 117 S.Ct. 2072.
* **
* * *Crane's convictions of kidnapping,
attempted aggravated sodomy, and
attempted rape arising from an incident
involving a video store clerk were reversed
by this court. 260 Kan. 208, 918 P.2d
1256. The State refiled charges of
attempted aggravated sodomy and
attempted rape. Then the State and Crane
entered into an agreement that concluded
the criminal matter with his entering a
plea of guilty to the single offense of
aggravated sexual battery. He pled guilty
in August 1997, and his conditional
release date was January 6, 1998. The
victim's testimony at Crane's sexual
predator trial revealed that the State told
her of its intention to follow Crane's plea
with a sexual predator petition in order to
prolong his confinement. * * *
Crane presents forceful arguments that
the application of the Act in his
circumstances has punitive features.
Crane, unlike Hendricks, did not admit
that his sexual behavior was on account of
an irresistible urge. Nor was there a
finding that Crane is unable to control his
behavior. * * *As we previously noted,
this case does not arise out of an
improvident plea bargain. Here, the State's
primary motive for filing the petition was
not to obtain treatment for the defendant.
However, so long as the State has an
evidentiary basis for filing the petition, its
motive should not render the resulting
judgment and commitment of the
defendant to be punitive.
We will address the remaining issues
raised by Crane, as they may again be
raised in the district court on remand.
Crane argues that the evidence of prior
sexual conduct should not have been
admitted into evidence when he had
agreed to stipulate to the convictions.
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The State was required to prove two
elements--(1) that Crane had been charged
with or convicted of a sexually violent
offense and (2) that he suffers from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder
that makes him likely to engage in repeat
acts of sexual violence. K.S.A.1999 Supp.
59-29a02(a). Accordingly, the jury was
instructed as follows:
"The State alleges the respondent is a
sexually violent predator. The respondent
denies the allegation."
"To establish this charge, each of the
following claims must be proved:"
1. That the respondent has been convicted
of Aggravated Sexual Battery, a sexually
violent offense; and
2. That the respondent suffers from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder
which makes the respondent likely to
engage in future predatory acts of sexual
violence, if not confined in a secure
facility."
Crane offered to stipulate with regard to
his status as a convicted sexual offender.
The State declined to stipulate. The State
argues that evidence of offenses other
than the conviction specified in the first
element is relevant to the second element
because mental health experts base
predictions of future sexual behavior on
past sexual behavior.
The district court permitted the State to
decline to stipulate and to call a number
of witnesses who testified about past
instances of Crane's sexual behavior. The
statement of facts in the State's brief on
appeal recounts the testimony of 11
"behavior" witnesses. Most of them
testified about incidents that were not
subject to proof. That is, most of them
testified about incidents other than the
aggravated sexual battery that was the
basis for the conviction the jury was
required to find.
In this case, Crane argues that K.S.A. 60-
447 should be effective where 60- 455 was
not, and he relies on State v Le, 266 Kan.
804, 977 P.2d 263 (1999), to give effect to
his offer to stipulate to conviction of
aggravated sexual battery. K.S.A 60-447
excludes evidence of specific instances of
conduct, other than evidence of
conviction of a crime, as proof of a
character trait. Ganhrr v Penixorr 197
Kan. 188, 416 P.2d 67 (1966). Because
most, if not all, of the complained-of
evidence was evidence of conviction of
crimes, it would not have been excluded
by K.S.A. 60-447. Crane's reliance on Lee
also lacks merit. In that case, the court
held that a criminal defendant's request to
stipulate that he or she is a convicted
felon must be honored and that the
stipulation will satisfy the State's burden
of proving the convicted felon element of
the crime of criminal possession of a
firearm. 266 Kan. 804, Syl. 4, 977 P.2d
263. The application of Lee, a criminal
proceeding, to the present proceeding is
questionable due to the criminal/civil
dichotomy. However, we need not answer
that question. In Lee, the court cautioned:
"Our views should not be read as limiting
the State in presenting a full in-depth story
of a prior crime when the prior crime has
relevance independent of merely proving
prior felony status for K.S.A. 21-
4204(a)(4) [possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon]." 266 Kan. at 816, 977
P.2d 263. This court held in Hay that the
evidence of prior conduct was material to
the question of likelihood that the
respondent would engage in repeat
conduct as well as to the element of
conviction of prior conduct. Thus, the
court's holding in Le does not apply in
this sexual predator proceeding.
Crane next argues that the State's failure
to personally serve him deprived the
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district court of jurisdiction. Crane
contends that the Act is a subpart of the
Care and Treatment Act for Mentally Ill
Persons (CTAMIP), K.S.A1999 Supp. 59-
2945 et say. He would have the court
regard the provision for notice to
proposed patients within the CITAIIP as
an umbrella provision extending to the
Act. His construct does not withstand
examination of the statutes. Both Acts are
in the Probate Code, Chapter 59. They do
not occupy the same article, however. The
CTIAMIP constitutes Article 29 of
Chapter, the Act constitutes Article 29a.
The Articles have different names,
different definitions, and different
functions. Without an express reference in
the Act to the notice provision of
CTAMIP, there is no basis for believing
that it applies equally under both.
Finally, Crane argues that the timing of
the State's petition against him did not
comply with statutory requirements. The
State filed a sexual predator petition
against Crane on December 11, 1997. He
was released on parole on January 6, 1998.
Crane contends that as a consequence of
the State's failing to serve him personally
with notice, the action was not
commenced against him before his
conditional release. As discussed in the
preceding paragraph, with no personal
service requirement in the Act, there is no
basis for Crane's contention in that regard.
With respect to the timing of the petition,
there is nothing in the record to suggest
that it was improper under the version of
K.S.A. 59-29a04 that was effective at the
time of Crane's release. K.S.A.1997 Supp.5 9
-29a04 provided for a petition to be
filed by the attorney general within 75
days of receiving written notice that
Crane's release was scheduled. K.S.A.1997
Supp. 59
-
2 9a03(a)(1) required the
Department of Corrections to give notice
90 days prior to Crane's anticipated
release.
It may be noted that in 1999 the
legislature added the following proviso to
59-29a04: "The provisions of this section
are not jurisdictional, and failure to
comply with such provisions in no way
prevents the attorney general from
proceeding against a person otherwise
subject to the provision of K.S.A. 59-
29a01 e seq., and amendments thereto."
K.S.A.1999 Supp. 59-29a04(b).
The judgment of the district court is
reversed, and the case is remanded for a
new trial.
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Justices Take Dispute Over "Sexual Predators"
The Associated Prss
Tuesday, April 3, 2001
Laurie Asseo
The Supreme Court said Monday it will
decide what proof states need to justify
locking criminals up as sexual predators
after their prison terms are over.
The justices said they will hear arguments
this fall on whether states must prove that
sexual predators are unable to control
their dangerous behavior. Kansas officials
argue against that standard, saying it is
enough to show that someone is
dangerous and has a serious mental-health
problem.
The lawyer for Michael T. Crane,
convicted twice of sex-related offenses,
said Monday that if the justices rule for
the state, "all they have to prove is that
he's done it before and he's likely to do it
again." Lawyer John C. Donham added,
"That's certainly not sufficient to commit
somebody to a mental hospital."Four
years ago, the justices ruled 5-4 in an
earlier Kansas case that it does not violate
criminals' constitutional rights to confine
them as sexual predators after they
complete their prison term.
The justices said the Kansas law, intended
to protect society, required a finding of a
"personality disorder that makes it
difficult, if not impossible, for the person
to control his dangerous behavior." No
finding of mental illness is required, the
court said.
The Kansas Supreme Court ruled last July
that a lower state court made it too easy to
use civil commitment proceedings to
confine people
predators.
as sexually violent
Crane had been convicted of exposing
himself to a tanning-salon attendant in
1993 and also pleaded guilty to aggravated
sexual battery in an attack on a video-store
clerk.
The state sought to have Crane locked up
as a sexually violent predator after he
completed his prison sentence.
A state judge decided the state did not
need to prove that Crane could not
control his dangerous behavior. Instead,
the judge told jurors to decide whether he
suffered from a personality disorder that
made him likely to engage in future acts of
sexual violence.
The jury ruled against Crane, and the
court ordered him confined in a state
facility. Crane is being held in the Lamed
State Security Hospital.
The Kansas Supreme Court ordered a
new trial Under the Supreme Court's
1997 ruling, people can be confined as
sexual predators only upon proof that
they cannot control their dangerous
behavior, the state court said.
In the appeal granted Supreme Court
review Monday, the state's lawyers said
the ruling would improperly limit the
number of sexual offenders who can be
committed for treatment.
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"Proof of dangerousness ... linked to a
serious mental problem" is enough to
meet the standards set by the Supreme
Court in 1997, the state's appeal said.
Crane's attorney said in court papers,
"Before the state can involuntarily commit
a person to a mental hospital, there must
be a finding that the person has lost the
ability to control his dangerous behavior."
The case is Kansas v. Crane, 00-957.
Copyright ' 2001 The Associated Press
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00-1519 United States v. Arvizu
Ruling Below (9th Gr., 232 F.3d 1241):
In determining whether Border Patrol agent's stop of minivan driven by defendant near
Mexican border was supported by reasonable suspicion, as Fourth Amendment requires,
district court should not have considered following facts: that defendant's vehicle slowed as
it approached agent's vehicle, that defendant failed to wave at or otherwise acknowledge
agent, that children in vehicle waved but did not turn towards agent while doing so, that one
minivan stopped on same road during past month was found to contain marijuana, that
agent did not recognize defendant's vehicle as belonging to local resident, that vehicle was
registered to address in city block notorious for smuggling, and that children's knees were
raised as if their feet were resting on some sort of cargo; remaining facts on which district
court relied in upholding stop- that road was sometimes used by smugglers, that defendant
was driving on that road near time at which Border Patrol shift change would occur, and that
minivans are sometimes used by smugglers- are legitimate and probative but are insufficient
to establish reasonable suspicion; illegal stop tainted defendant's consent to search that
revealed duffel bag of marijuana under children's feet.
Questions Presented: (1) Did court of appeals erroneously depart form totality-of-
circumstances test that governs reasonable-suspicion determinations under Fourth
Amendment by holding that seven facts observed by law enforcement officer were entitled
to no weight and could not be considered as matter of law? (2) Under totality-of-
circumstances test, did Border Patrol agent in this case have reasonable suspicion that
justified stop of vehicle near Mexican border?
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee
v.
Ralph ARVIZU, Defendant-Appellant
United State Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Amended December 1, 2000
REINHARDT, Circuit Judge: second, whether he validly consented to
the subsequent search of his van.
Ralph Arvizu appeals from the district Because the district court erred in
court's denial of his motion to suppress finding that the stop was justified by
marijuana found in his van by a boarder reasonable suspicion, we reverse.
patrol agent. Arvizu raises two issues
before this court: first, whether the stop 1. Factu2lBackgrund
of his van by a Border Patrol agent was e events in question took place on thejustified by a reasonable suspicion; and afternoon of January 19, 1998 on Lesle
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Canyon Road near Douglas, Arizona.
Leslie Canyon Road is a largely unpaved,
flat, and well-maintained road in the
Coronado National Forest that parallels
Highway 191. * * * Although Border
Patrol Agent Stoddard asserted that the
road is rarely traveled by anyone other
than ranchers and forest service personnel
and is "very desolate," at its southern end,
it is paved for about ten miles, and there
are residences on both sides. * * *
Moreover, there is a national forest in the
area, as well as the Chiricahua National
Monument, both of which attract a
number of visitors. There are also
campgrounds and picnic areas around
Rucker Canyon. ***
The Douglas Arizona border station is
located about 30 miles from the boarder
on the highway at the intersection of I-
191 and Rucker Canyon Road. The
station is not operational every day of the
year, although on January 19 it was. On
that occasion, Border Patrol Agent
Stoddard was working at the Douglas
station. * * * About 2:15 p.r that
afternoon, a sensor alerted him to the fact
that a car was traveling north on Leslie
Canyon Road. * * * Stoddard testified
that this made him suspicious for three
reasons: first, the timing-the car passed by
around 2 p.m. and officers change shifts
at 3 p.m. According to Officer Stoddard,
smugglers often try to synchronize their
movements with shift changes. * * *
Second, cars traveling north sometimes
use the surrounding, unpaved roads to
bypass the station. Third, another officer
had stopped a minivan heading north on
that road a month earlier and had found
marijuana.
His curiosity piqued, Stoddard drove east
on Rucker Canyon Road to intersect with
Leslie Canyon Road. As he drove, he
received another report of sensor activity,
indicating that the vehicle was heading
west on Rucker from Leslie Canyon.
After Stoddard passed Kuykendall Road,
he noticed a Toyota minivan approaching
in a cloud of dust. Stoddant proceeded to
pull over to the side of the road to
observe the minivan as it approached.
Although he did not have a radar gun, the
agent guessed that the van was traveling at
50 to 55 miles per hour when he first
spotted it. According to Stoddard, the
minivan slowed as it neared his car. In the
minivan was Ralph Arvizu, accompanied
by his sister, Julie Reyes, and her three
children-Julisa, Renato, and Guillermo.
As the Toyota passed, Stoddard observed
the two adults in the front, and three
children in the back According to
Stoddard, the driver appeared rigid and
nervous. Stoddard based this conclusion
on the fact that Arvizu had stiff posture,
kept both hands on the steering wheel,
and did not acknowledge him. According
to Stoddard, this was unusual because
drivers in the area habitually "give us a
friendly wave." Stoddard also noticed that
the knees of the two children sitting in the
very back seat were higher than normal, as
if their feet were resting on some object
placed below the seat.
As the minivan passed, Stoddard decided
to follow it. As he did, the children began
to wave. According to Stoddard, this
seemed odd because the children did not
turn around to wave to him; rather, they
sat in their seats and continued to face
forward. The "waving" continued off and
on for about four to five minutes. Based
on this, Stoddard believed that the
children had been instructed to wave at
him by the adults in the front seat.
As the two cars approached the
intersection with Kuykendall Road,
Stoddard noticed that the Toyota's right
turn signal was flashing. It was turned off
briefly, but was turned on again shortly
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before the intersection. The Toyota then
turned on to Kuykendall, an action which
Stoddard also found suspicious because
Kuykendall was the last road a car would
take to avoid the border station on
Highway 191. * * *
At this point, Stoddard ran a vehicle
registration check and discovered that the
van's license plates were valid, and that
the car was registered in Leticia Arvizu at
403 4h Street in Douglas, Arizona. At the
suppression hearing, Stoddard testified
that the neighborhood in which 403 4th
Street was located was "one of the most
notorious areas" for drug and alien
smuggling. * * *
On cross-examination, Stoddard
conceded that he had no information
about smuggling activities either at 403 4th
Street in particular or on that part of
Leticia Aivizu, in whose name the
minivan was registered.
At this point, Stoddard decided to stop
the van. As he approached the driver's
side, he noticed that there was something
underneath the children's feet. As
Stoddard approached the Toyota, Arvizu
leaned out the window and said "Good
morning, officer. How are you doing?"
According to Stoddard, Arvizu appeared
nervous, and did not remember the name
of the park to which he was driving.
When Stoddard asked Arvizu about his
citizenship, Arvizu replied that he was in
fact an American citizen, as were all of the
minivan's occupants. When Stoddard
asked if Arvizu had anything or anyone
hidden in the van, Arvizu said no.
Nevertheless, Stoddard asked if he could
look around the van, a request which
Arvizu said he interpreted as a request to
look around the outside of the vehicle,
not to look inside. (At the suppression
hearing, both Arvizu and his sister
testified that Stoddard had his hand on his
gun when he approached the vehicle and
asked to look around. Stoddard denied
this.) Stoddard did not tell Arvizu that he
had a right to refuse, nor did he read
Arvizu his Miranda rights. When Arvizu
agreed to let Stoddard look around, the
agent walked around to the passenger's
side and opened the sliding door.
Stoddard testified that as he did so, he saw
a black duffel bag and smelled marijuana.
Stoddard proceeded to open the bag and
discovered marijuana inside.
Arvizu was charged with possession with
intent to distribute marijuana, in violation
of 21 U.S.C § 841(a)(1). At a suppression
hearing, Arvizu argued first, that Stoddard
did not have reasonable suspicion to stop
the minivan, and second, that he did not
give voluntary consent to the search of his
van. The district court rejected both
arguments and denied the motion to
suppress. Arvizu then entered a
conditional guilty plea, under which he
reserved the right to appeal the denial of
his motion to suppress. This appeal
followed.
2. LegalBackgmund
In order to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment's strictures, an investigatory
stop may be made only if the officer in
question has "a reasonable suspicion
supported by articulable facts that
criminal activity may be afoot... " * * *
In determining whether reasonable
suspicion exists, we must take into
account the totality of the circumstances.
* * * At the same time, however, factors
that have so little probative value that no
reasonable officer would rely on them in
deciding to make an investigative stop
must be disregarded. ** *
Although the level of suspicion required
for a brief investigatory stop is less
demanding than that required to establish
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probable cause, the Fourth Amendment
requires an objective justification for such
a stop. * * * Thus, the Supreme Court has
held that reasonable suspicion does not
exist where an officer can articulate only
"an inchoate and unparticularized
suspicion or 'hunch' of criminal activity.'"
Illini v Wanon 528 U.S. 119, 124, 120
S. C. 673, 676, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000).
Rather, reasonable suspicion exists only
when an officer is aware of a specific,
articulable facts which, when considered
with objective and reasonable inferences,
form a basis for ptiadn&zai suspicion. *
* * In turn, particularized suspicion means
a reasonable suspicion that dx patiadar
pmson eing stppe has committed, or is
about to commit, a crime. Unit Stats v
Cot, 449 U.S. 411,418, 101 S. C. 690.
At times, conduct that may be entirely
innocuous when viewed in isolation may
nevertheless properly be considered in
determining whether or not reasonable
suspicion exists. * * * Put another way,
"conduct that is not necessarily indicative
of criminal activity may, in certain
circumstances, be relevant to the
reasonable suspicion calculus." Unitd
State v Montrv-Cangu 208 F. 3d 1122,
1130 (9 C r. 2000)(en banc); Wan&ng 528
U.S. at 125, 120 S. Ct. at 677. At the
same time, innocuous conduct does nt
justify an investigatory stop unless other
information or surrounding circumstances
of which the police are aware, considered
together with the otherwise innocent
conduct, provides sufficient reason to
suspect that criminal activity either has
occurred or is about to take place. * * *
In all circumstances, law enforcement
officials are entitled to assess the facts in
light of their experience. Brini-Przz
422 US. at 885, 95 S. Cc. 2574.
Nevertheles, "[w]hile an officer may
evaluate the facts supporting reasonable
suspicion in light of his experience,
experience may not be used to give the
officers unbridled discretion in making a
stop." Nicaao v INS, 797 F.2d 700, 705
(9" Cir 1986), * * * Thus, while an
officer's experience may furnish the
background against which the relevant
facts are to be assessed as long as the
inferences he draws are objectively
reasonable, Conz, 449 U.S. at 418, 101 S.
Ct. 690, experience is not an independent
factor in the reasonable suspicion analysis.
Mon-erCanW, 208 F.3d at 1131-32.
3. Analysis
In finding that the stop by Agent
Stoddard was justified by reasonable
suspicion, the district court relied on the
following list of factors: 1) smugglers used
the road in question to avoid the border
patrol station; 2) Arvizu drove by within
an hour of a Border Patrol shift change; 3)
a minivan stopped on the same road a
month earlier contained drugs; 4)
minivans are among the types of vehicles
commonly used by smugglers; 5) the
minivan slowed as it approached the
Border Patrol vehicle; 6) Arvizu appeared
rigid and stiff, and did not acknowledge
the officer, 7) the officer did not
recognize the minivan as a local car, 8) the
children's knees were raised, as if their
feet were resting on something on the
floor of the van; 9) the children waved for
several minutes but not towards the
officer, and 10) the van was registered to
an address in a neighborhood notorious
for smuggling. Based on these factors, the
district court concluded that reasonable
suspicion did exist. We disagree.
"What factors law enforcement officers
may consider in deciding to stop and
question citizens minding their own
business should, if possible, be carefully
circumscribed and clearly articulated.
When courts invoke multi-factor tests,
balancing of interests or fact-specific
219
weighing of circumstances, this introduces
a troubling degree of uncertainty and
unpredictability into the process; no one
can be sure whether a particular
combination of factors will justify a stop
until a court has ruled on it." Marefa
Czrmgp, 208 F.3d at 1142 (Kozinski, J.
concurring). Thus we attempt here to
describe and clearly delimit the extent to
which certain factors may be considered
by law enforcement officers in making
stops such as the stop involved here.
In reaching our conclusion, we find that
some of the factors on which the district
court relied are neither relevant nor
appropriate to a reasonable suspicion
analysis in this case, and that others, singly
and collectively, are insufficient to give
rise to reasonable suspicion. We begin by
considering the factors the district court
improperly relied on, before turning to
those which it properly took into account.
One of the factors on which the district
court relied-namely, the fact that the
minivan slowed as it approached the
Border Patrol vehicle-is squarely
prohibited by our precedent. Unitai States
v MorteamCanrm 208 F.3d at 1136;
Unied State v Gania-Czdndxo 53 F.3d
244, 247 (9h Cir. 1995). We note that
Agent Stoddard never claimed that Arvizu
broke any traffic laws. Nor, for that
matter, did he assert that Arvizu drove
erratically or evasively. Rather, Arvizu
simply slowed down. As we have
previously noted, slowing down after
spotting a law enforcement vehicle is an
entirely normal response that is in no way
indicative of criminal activity. Id at 247;
Unid State v Hemrndez-Ahurado, 891
F.2d 1414, 1419 (9th Cir. 1989).
A second factor relied on by the district
court, Arvizu's failure to acknowledge
Agent Stoddard, is of "questionable value
... generally" * * * and carries weight, if at
all, only under special circumstances. See
HermnIz-A/wrado, 891 F.2d at 1419 n. 6
* * * As we have held previously, a failure
to acknowledge a law enforcement officer
by look or gesture, while possibly
indicating a lack of neighborliness,
ordinarily does not provide a basis for
suspecting criminal activity. Gania-
Crnubo, 53 F.3d at 247; Gazakz-Riera,
22 F.3d at 1446. * * * Because no "special
circumstances" rendered "innocent
avoidance . . . improbable," Arvizu's
failure to acknowledge Stoddard's
presenece by waving, or by indicating
some other form of recognition,
Herndez-Aharado, 891 F.2d at 1419 n. 6,
provides no support for Stoddard's
reasonable suspicion determination.
For similar reasons, we find that the
children's conduct carries no weight in the
reasonable suspicion calculus. If every
odd act engaged in by one's children while
sitting in the back seat of the family
vehicle could contribute to a finding of
reasonable suspicion, the vast majority of
American parents might be stopped
regularly within a block of their homes.
More to the point, if a driver's failure to
wave at an officer provides no support for
a determination to stop a vehicle, it would
be incongruous to say that the vehicle
could be stopped because children who
were passengers in the car did wave. Se,
eg, Gania-Card 53 F.3d at 247.
As we have previously held, "factors that
have such a low probative value that no
reasonable officer would have relied on
them to make an investigative stop must
be disregarded as a matter of law."
Monremarip, 208 F.3d at 1132 (citation
omitted). An examination of four
additional factors-namely, the third,
seventh, eighth, and tenth-demonstrate
that they have little or no weight under
the circumstances. The fact that one
minivan stopped in the past month on the
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same road contained marijuana is
insufficient to maint all minivans with
suspicion. (In contrast, as we discuss
below, evidence that in the Border
Patrol's experience, minivans are
sometimes used by smugglers may be of
saw probative value, because the
inference arises from more than a single,
isolated incident.)
The fact that the officer did not recognize
the minivan as belonging to a local
resident also fails to contribute to the
reasonable suspicion calculus. Evidence
introduced at the suppression hearing
made it clear that the area in question is
one that is used for many purposes by
different kinds of people-local residents
use the roads as a shortcut, while both
residents and tourists alike camp, hike,
bike, picnic, and visit the local forest and
national monument. Accordingly, it is
hardly surprising that a Border Patrol
agent would not recognize every passing
car.
Similarly, the fact that a van is registered
to an address in a block notorious for
smuggling is also of no significance and
may not be given any weight. See Umital
State u Jinmz-Maiu, 173 F.3d 752, 755
(9h Cir. 1999) (holding that "coming from
the wrong neighborhood" does not give
rise to reasonable suspicion). In arriving
at this conclusion, we first consider the
cases which involve an individual's
presence in a high crime area. The rule
that controls such cases is that presence in
a high crime area is not enough un and of
itself to give rise to reasonable suspicion,
Bmun u Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 59, 99 S. Ct.
2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979), but "officers
are not required to ignore the relevant
characteristics of a location" when an
individual's conduct, if considered in the
context of that location, gives rise to
reasonable suspicion that a crime has been
or is being committed. WanioN 528 U.S.
at 124, 120 S. Ct. at 676 * * * In contrast,
where a person lives is an entirely
different matter, and one's place of
residence is simply not relevant to a
determination of reasonable suspicion.
Otherwise, persons forced to reside in
high crime areas for economic reasons
(who are frequently members of minority
groups) would be compelled to assume a
greater risk not only of becoming the
victims of crimes but also of being
victimized by the state's efforts to prevent
those crimes-because their constitutional
protections against unreasonable
intrusions would be significantly reduced.
Moreover, in MontemCann , we
cautioned that "courts should examine
with care the specific data underlying" the
assertion that an area is one in which
"particular crimes occur with unusual
regularity." * * * Mnewm-Canago, 208
F.3d at 1138. In this case, the data simply
does not withstand that scrutiny. The
only evidence in the record to support the
"high crime" characterization is
Stoddard's assertion that the 400 block
was "one of the most notorious areas" for
drug and alien smuggling. Agent Stoddard
did not explain the factual basis for this
assertion, nor did he identify the source of
his information. For this reason as well,
we conclude that the district court's
reliance on this factor was misplaced. See
Mo&neCanng, 208 F.3d at 1143 * * *
Finally, we note that the fact that the
children's knees were raised, while
consistent with the placement of their feet
on packages of illicit substances, is equally
(if not more) consistent with the resting of
their feet on a cooler, picnic basket,
camping gear, or suitcase. In determining
whether reasonable suspicion exists, we
have considered whether a car appears
heavily loaded. * * * We have done so
where the vehicle was riding low or
responded sluggishly to bumps. Gania-
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Czmaho, 53 F.3d at 245 * ** In general,
however, we have not given that factor
much weight, absent other circumstances
that warrant attributing particular
significance to it. * * * In this case,
moreover, we are faced with an entirely
different situation, in which Officer
Stoddard first inferred from the fact that
the children's knees were raised that their
feet were resting on some sort of object.
From this, he next inferred that whatever
the children were using as a footrest might
well be contraband. That a family
traveling in a minivan might put objects
on the floor of the van and that children
might use those objects as a footrest does
not seem at all odd to us. In short, we
find this factor also to be all too common
to be of any relevance.
Having considered those factors that are
not relevant in this case, we must now turn
to those that are-namely, that the road was
sometimes used by smugglers, that Arvizu
was driving on the road near the time that
the Border Patrol shift changed, and that
he was driving a minivan, a type of car
sometimes used by smugglers. Although
these factors are indeed both legitimate
and probative to sar degree, * * * they
are not enough to constitute reasonable
suspicion either singly or collectively. * *
*
As the testimony at the suppression
hearing made clear, the road in question is
used for a number of entirely innocuous
purposes-including as a way of getting to
camping grounds and recreational areas,
and as a shortcut when traveling from one
community to another. Thus, the fact
that Arvizu's car was using the road is of
only moderate significance. Similarly,
minivans, although sometimes used by
smugglers, are among the best-selling
family car models in the United States.
Thus, although, under applicable case law,
the make of the car may be of scnre
relevance in determining whether
reasonable suspicion exists, it does not
carry particular weight here. United State
v Bngnani-Pnxe, 422 U.S. 873, 885, 96 S.
Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); United
States v Ganma-Banun, 116 F.3d 1305, 1307
(9  Cir. 1997); Buguin-Gasas, 484 F.2d at
855. We also find that the time at which
Arvizu drove by the sensors on Leslie
Canyon Road, although relevant, Franwo-
Mw, 952 F.2d at 1057, is of little
probative value, especially in the absence
of other factors that tend more
persuasively to demonstrate evasive
behavior. Jinerz-Medina, 173 F.3d at 754-
55. In this case, Arvizu's car passed by
the sensors at around 2:15 p.m.,
approximately 45 minutes before the
scheduled shift change. While it makes
sense to us that smugglers might wish to
take advantage of shift changes, a car's
traveling on a road in the general area of
the Border Patrol station three quarters of
an hour before the actual shift change
does not seem to us to add much to the
mix.
Given the above analysis, we hold that the
stop by Agent Stoddard was not
supported by reasonable suspicion. The
next question, then, is whether the
illegality of the stop taints the evidence as
a result of the search that ensued. We
hold that it does.
Under the Fourth Amendment, an illegal
stop taints all evidence obtained pursuant
to the stop, unless the taint is purged by
subsequent events. Unital State v Moraks,
972 F.2d 1007, 1010 (9' Cir. 1992); United
State u Ddgzdillo Vsquez, 856 F.2d 1292,
1299 (9' Cir. 1988). Accordingly, in
Flonda u Ro)er, 460 U.S. 491, 508, 103 S.
Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983), the
Supreme Court suppressed the evidence
discovered as a result of a search
following an illegal stop, even though the
police obtained the defendant's consent to
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the search, because the illegal stop tainted
the subsequent consent. * * *
In determining whether the taint of an
illegal stop has been purged, "[tlhe
question we must ask is whether, granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the
evidence . . . has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by
means sufficiently distinguishable to be
purged of the primary taint." Unital State
v Millan, 36 F.3d 886, 890 (9' Cir. 1994)
(internal quotations omitted). The
government bears the burden of showing
admissibility. Unital Stat v Taho, 648
F.2d 598, 601 (9d' Cir. 1981); Unital State
v Pemz-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1290 (9h
Cir. 1979).
Federal courts have invariably found that
consents to search at the time of or
shortly following an illegal stop of a
vehicle are unlawful because the search is
tainted by the primary illegality and the
taint has not been purged. * * * That
makes sense to us. Onlinarily, when a car
is illegally stopped, the search that follows
will be a product of that stop, as will any
consent to that search. Here, the
interrogation, consent and search flowed
directly from the stop. Unital StatEs
Hemaniez, 55 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 1995);
Milan, 36 F.3d at 890. No events
occurred after the stop that served to
purge the subsequent consent and search
of the taint. Rather, the officer merely
questioned Arvizu, became suspicious
because of his answers, and asked for
consent. This is a classic case of obtaining
evidence through the exploitation of an
illegal stop, as is the case in which an
officer's suspicions are aroused by what
he observes following the stop, and on
that basis obtains such consent.
Accordingly, we hold that the taint of the
illegal stop was not purged by intervening
events.
Because we conclude that the stop by
Agent Stoddard was not supported by
reasonable suspicion and that there were
no intervening events that purged the taint
of the illegal stop, we reverse the district
court's denial of Arvizu's motion to
suppress.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
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00-1260 United States v. Knights
Ruling Below (9 Cir., 219 F.3d 1138, 67 Crim. L. Rep. 682):
Defendant's agreement that, as condition of probation, he will submit to searches of himself,
his property, and his residence by any probation officer or law enforcement officer at any
time, with or without search warrant, arrest warrant, or reasonable cause, cannot, under
Fourth Amendment, justify warrantless search of home conducted not for probation
purposes but as part of criminal investigation.
Question Presented: Does defendant's agreement o term of probation that authorized any
law enforcement officer to search his person or premises with or without warrant, and with
or without individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, constitute valid consent to search by law
enforcement officer investigating crimes?
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant
V.
Mark James KNIGHTS, Steven Simoneau, Defendants-Appellees
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
Argued and Submitted July 11, 2000
FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge:
The United States appeals from an order
which suppressed evidence seized from
the home of Mark James Knights in a
warrantless search conducted by
members of the Sheriff's Department of
Napa County, California. It claims that
the evidence was properly seized during
a probation search. The district court
disagreed; so do we. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
From 1996 on, Pacific Gas and Electric
Company's facilities in Napa County had
been subjected to vandalism over 30
times. Those incidents included short
circuits caused by throwing chains onto
transformers, damaging of gas power
switches, and damaging of power pole
guy wires. Suspicion had focused on
Knights, and on his friend, Steven
Simoneau. Many things contributed to
that. In the first place, those vandalisms
started after Knights' electrical services
had been discontinued in March of 1996
because he not only did not pay his bill,
but also had found a way to steal services
by bypassing PG & E's meter. Detective
Todd Hancock of the Sheriff's
Department also thought it noteworthy
that incidents of vandalism of PG & E
property seemed to coincide with
Knights' court appearance dates
regarding the theft of PG & E services.
More than that, on May 24, 1998,
Knights and Simoneau were stopped by
a sheriff's deputy near a PG & E gas line.
They could not explain their presence in
the area to the deputy, who observed
that Simoneau's pick-up truck contained
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pipes, pieces of chain, tools, and
gasoline. The deputy asked to search the
vehicle, but was refused permission. A
few days later, a pipe bomb was
detonated against the exterior of a
building where a burglary had taken
place. That building was not far from
Knights' residence.
For our purposes, the final incident
occurred on the morning of June 1,
1998. Some miscreant, or miscreants,
had managed to knock out telephone
service to the Napa County Airport by
breaking into a Pacific Bell
telecommunications vault and setting fire
to it. Brass padlocks which secured the
vault and an adjacent PG & E power
transformer had been removed, and a
gasoline accelerant had been used to
ignite the fire. Within a short time after
that incident occurred, a sheriff's deputy
drove by Knights' residence and
observed Simoneau's truck parked in
front. The deputy got out of his patrol
car and felt the hood of Simoneau's
truck. It was still warm at the time, which
suggested that Knights and Simoneau
might have been involved in the
vandalism. The investigation focused
even more purposefully upon them as a
result.
Thus, on June 3, 1998, Hancock set up
surveillance of Knights' apartment. At
approximately 1:45 a.rm., Knights and
Simoneau arrived at the apartment in
Simoneau's pick-up truck. The two
proceeded to enter the apartment where
they remained with the lights on until
about 3:10 a.m. At that point, Simoneau
emerged from the apartment carrying
three cylindrical items cradled in his
arms. On the basis of his training,
Hancock believed those to be pipe
bombs. Simoneau walked to the truck,
placed an object shaped like a jar in the
back of it, and then walked across the
street to the bank of the Napa River,
where he disappeared from view.
Hancock then heard three splashes as
Simoneau, seemingly, deposited those
objects in the river. Simoneau returned
to the truck without the cylinders, picked
up a glass jar from the truck bed and
wiped it with a cloth. He then climbed
into that truck and departed.
Hancock trailed Simoneau until he
stopped in a driveway. When Hancock
entered the driveway Simoneau was not
around, but Hancock discovered a
number of suspicious objects in and
about the truck. In the bed of the truck
were a Molotov cocktail and explosive
materials. Also, a gasoline can and two
brass padlocks, which seemed to fit the
description given by PG & E
investigators of the locks removed from
the Pacific Bell and PG & E transformer
vault two days earlier, were observed.
The truck was seized, impounded, and
later searched pursuant to a warrant.
With all of that information in hand,
Hancock decided that he would conduct
a warrantless "probation" search of
Knights' home. As Hancock saw it, he
did not need to obtain a warrant because
at an earlier time Knights had been
placed on summary probation after he
was convicted of a state misdemeanor
drug offense. A person on summary
probation in California is not under the
direct supervision of a probation officer.
However, in this case, a term of that
probation required Knights to "[s]ubmit
his ... person, property, place of
residence, vehicle, personal effects, to
search at anytime, with or without a
search warrant, warrant of arrest or
reasonable cause by any probation
officer or law enforcement officer."
Relying upon that and the authorization
of his supervisor, Hancock proceeded.
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He began to organize the search at about
5:00 a.m. that morning, and conducted it
at 8:00 a.m. after breaking through a
door and entering the apartment where
Knights was still abed. The search was
productive. It turned up detonation cord,
ammunition, unidentified liquid
chemicals, instruction manuals on
chemistry and electrical circuitry, bolt
cutters, telephone pole-climibing spurs,
drug paraphernalia, photographs and
blueprints stolen from the burglarized
building, and a brass padlock stamped
PG & E. Needless to say, Knights was
arrested.
Ultimately, Knights found himself in
federal court because he was indicted for
conspiracy to commit arson, for
possession of an unregistered destructive
device, and for being a felon in
possession of ammunition. See 18 U.S.C
%§ 371, 922(g); 26 U.S.C § 5861(d). He
moved to suppress the evidence seized
in the June 3, 1998, search, and the
government asserted that it was
conducted pursuant to a probation
consent. The district court agreed with
Knights that the claimed probation
search was really a subterfuge for an
investigative search and ordered
suppression. This appeal followed.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A district court's determination of
whether there was consent to search is
generally treated as a factual
determination, but we have said that in
"determining whether as a general nle
certain types of actions give rise to an
inference of consent, de novo review is
appropriate." Unital States v Shaibu, 920
F.2d 1423, 1425 (9th Cir.1990). The
district court's conclusion that the
probation search of Knights' apartment
was a subterfuge for a criminal
investigation is a factual determination
which we review for clear error. See
Uit Stat, v Watts, 67 F.3d 790, 793-94
(9th Cir.1995), nvd on thr g d, 519
US. 148, 117 S.Ct. 633, 136 L.Ed.2d 554
(1997).
DISCUSSION
The difficulties at the interface between a
person's right to the security of his home
and the needs of law enforcement are
senipitemnal. Nonetheless, the balance is
weighted in favor of the home dweller
for reasons with a weighty ancient
lineage. * * *
* * *The Fourth Amendment carried
forward and burnished the principles
upon which they relied when it
commanded that "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall
not be violated...." * * *.
Of course, there can be no doubt that a
person can consent to a search of his
home, although we carefully scrutinize
claims that he has done so. See Shaibu
920 F.2d at 1425-26. There also can be
little doubt that Knights did consent to
searches when he agreed to the terms of
his probation. * * *But we have made it
clear that his consent must be seen as
limited to probation searches, and must
stop short of investigation searches. We
simply have refused to recognize the
viability of a more expansive
probationary consent to search term.
That was illustrated in 1985, when we
were faced with a California probationer
who had not had supervision services
commenced and at whose home a
supposed probation search was
conducted. See Mewhnt, 760 F.2d at 965.
We had this to say after we reviewed the
record:
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The facts show that none of the law
enforcement officers reasonably could
have believed that the search related to
the interests of effective probation
supervision. There is no showing that
the state ever made any efforts toward
rehabilitating Merchant. He did not
receive supervision or counseling. In
fact, he was never even assigned a
probation officer.
The search was conducted because the
assistant district attorney had received
reports of gunfire on Merchant's
property. These facts strongly suggest
that the search was a subterfuge for
conducting a criminal investigation. We
have condemned the practice of using a
search condition imposed on a
probationer as a broad tool for law
enforcement. Because the search here
clearly was not a genuine attempt to
enforce probation but apparently had a
motive of avoidance of Fourth
Amendment requirements, it is the type
of law enforcement conduct that ought
to be deterred. Consequently, the
exclusionary rule applies with full force.
Id at 969 (citations omitted).
* * X
Here, the district court's determination
that the purpose of the Sheriff's
Department was the investigation of
Knights and the termination of his
nefarious career, rather than a probation
search, was not clearly erroneous.
Indeed, it was an almost ineluctable
conclusion. Detective Hancock, and his
cohorts, were not a bit interested in
Knights' rehabilitation. They were
interested in investigating and ending the
string of crimes of which Knights was
thought to be the perpetrator. That
string began long before his summary
probation started. In fact, his probation
started just three days before the last
incident. True, a probation officer may
also wish to end wrongdoing by a
probationer, but there was no "also"
about Detective Hancock's purpose. He
was performing his duty as a law
enforcement officer and had drawn
some very good inferences from the
facts, but he was using the probation
term as a subterfuge to enable him to
search Knights' home without a warrant.
In so doing, he crossed the frontier that
separates citizen privacy from official
enthusiasm. The subterfuge will not
work. That would seem to bring this
opinion to a logical close, but we must
pause to consider a number of
arguments against this result.
The government first asserts that the
Supreme Court severely undercut our
probation search jurisprudence when it
issued Whnrn v Unital State, 517 U.S.
806, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89
(1996). In fact, says the government, our
jurisprudence is so weakened that this
panel should give it the slight tap that
will send it crashing to the ground. We
will not do that for at least two reasons
beyond pure principle. In the first place,
we have reiterated our rule since Whnn
was decided. Se Oe; 116 F.3d at 372.
Secondly, the government's argument
turns on the notion that the subjective
purposes of the officers should not be
considered if, objectively, a probation
officer could have conducted a
probation search. That argument is
based upon the holding of Whn that the
reasonableness of traffic stops with
probable cause does not depend upon
the subjective intentions of the officers.
See Whn, 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Cz. at
1774. That form of argument is far off
target when applied in the context at
hand. Here the issue is not whether a
search or seizure with probable cause
should be invalidated because of an
officer's subjective intentions. It is,
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rather, whether, without another basis
for a warrantless home search, there was
consent to the search in the first place.
That is a different question entirely. It
depends on whether the consent covers
what the officer did. See Unital States v
W"im; 202 F.3d 1, 12-13 (1st Cir.),
petition for act fdid 69 U.S.L.W. 3087
(U.S. June 22, 2000) (No. 00-60). We
recognize that the California Supreme
Court disagrees with our Wlin analysis.
Sw People v Wod, 21 Cal.4th 668, 677-
81, 981 P.2d 1019, 1025-27, 88
Cal.Rptr.2d 88, 94-97 (1999). But, then,
that court does not control our reading
of federal constitutional law, and for the
reasons already stated, we find its
analysis unpersuasive. However, mention
of that case does lead to another of the
government's arguments.
The government asserts that in order to
avoid confusing state law enforcement
officers we should accept the fruits of
their search, even if we think that the
search was unconstitutional under the
United States Constitution. We think
not. While state court rulings, especially
on questions of state law, may be of
interest, they do not determine the
legality of a search for Fourth
Amendment purposes. Sw Cde) 116
F.3d at 372. Application of the
exclusionary rule regarding searches does
not ordinarily turn on state law, even if
the state courts would take a more
stringent view. See United States v Cornmier,
220 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir.2000); United
States v Mara, 982 F.2d 1384, 1387 (9th
Cir.1993); see also id at 1389 (Fernandez,J., concurring). More to the purpose,
accepting the government's argument
would amount to the recrudescence of
the silver platter doctrine. But that
platter was melted down by the Supreme
Court in Elkit v United States, 364 U.S.
206, 208, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 1439, 4 L.Ed.2d
1669 (1960), where the Court rejected
the idea that the fruits of a search by
state officers which would be
unconstitutional if conducted by federal
officers could be introduced in a federal
criminal trial. We will not refabricate that
platter.
The government passingly makes the
argument that the officers relied in good
faith on California law, and, therefore,
suppression should not follow. We have
previously rejected just that kind of
argument in this context. See Menrda
760 F.2d at 968-69. At any rate, the
officers were not trapped into relying on
some state law or ordinance which was
later found to be unconstitutional. Se
Ilincs v Kl 480 U.S. 340, 349-50, 107
S.Ct. 1160, 1167, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987);
(f Gnnsnun v City ofPodlar 33 F.3d
1200, 1209- 10 (9th Cir.1994). For at least
three decades, it has been the law of this
circuit that subterfuge probation
searches are unconstitutional. Perhaps
the California courts will admit the fruits
of the search of Knights' residence; we
will not.
Finally, argues the government, the
purposes of a probation search were
served because Knights was supposed to
"obey all laws," was deterred by the
search from being a threat to the
community, and was further deterred
from engaging in further criminal
activity. No doubt a true probation
search can serve those ends. Then, too,
so does an investigative search. In fine,
with its aduncous argument the
government hopes to indirectly eliminate
our cases which rely on the difference
between probation and investigation
searches. It cannot. * * *
CONCLUSION
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As we enter the 21st Century, citizens find
the very notion of privacy under almost
relentless assault. Random suspiciousness
taking and testing of body fluids
proliferates on ever more flimsy grounds;
motor vehicle departments sell
information about those who are forced
to give it in order to obtain driver's
licenses; banks use private account
information for other purposes and
provide it to other related entities; when a
consumer visits a website, a spy is placed
in his computer, it has become easier to
invade homes without knocking and
giving notice; and on and on. In this
climate, it is easy to develop callouses on
our sense of privacy. Perhaps it even
seems quaint to worry much about the
sanctity of a home where we can speak,
listen, read, write and think in privacy.
Perhaps it seems even more quaint to
worry about "[a] probationer's home
[which], like anyone else's, is protected by
the Fourth Amendment's requirement
that searches be 'reasonable.' " Gnffin v
MsarsiA 483 U.S. 868, 873, 107 S.Ct.
3164, 3168, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987). But
worry we must, and do.
We now reiterate our insistence that even
when a probationer has consented to
searches of his home as a condition of his
probation, those searches must be
conducted for probation purposes and
not as a mere subterfuge for the pursuit of
criminal investigations. In making this
decision we need not rely on some
resident numen or wait for Fulgora to
light our way. We can, instead, rely upon
the wisdom of the ages and upon the
sagacity of the numerous Ninth Circuit
judges who have written before us. If we
do not heed all of that history and
learning, who will
AFFIRMED.
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Court to Examine Evidence Procedure
Associated Piss
Monday, May 14, 2001
Anne Gearan
The Supreme Court agreed Monday to
decide if police may prosecute new
crimes with evidence seized from homes
of criminals who consented to blanket
searches as a condition of probation.
The Justice Department and California's
attorney general both asked the justices to
reconsider lower court rulings that threw
out bombmaking supplies other evidence
seized during the search of a home of a
man on probation for an unrelated drug
cime.
At issue is the rationale for searches of
probationers' homes, and whether a
probationer waives constitutional
protections by giving advance consent to a
search.
The case concerns a northern California
man suspected of a series of vandalism
attacks on Pacific Gas & Electric
transformers and other property.
Mark James Knights had a long history
with the utility, which had accused him of
stealing electric service and running out
on his bill.
As a condition of probation for a drug
conviction in 1998, Knights agreed to let
police or probation officers search him,
his home, car or other property at will.
Sometimes called a "Fourth waiver," the
form Knights signed greatly limits his
Fourth Amendment protection against
unreasonable search or seizure.
Knights contended police used his
probationer status as a pretext to follow a
hunch that he and a friend were behind an
explosion and fire that damaged a PG&E
transformer. The explosion knocked out
telephone service to the Napa County
Airport.
The early morning search of Knights'
apartment was intended only to
investigate the fire, and not to check up
on Knights' rehabilitation for the drug
conviction, he argued.
Police watched the pair for two days after
the fire, and then went into Knights'
apartment without a warrant. There, they
found detonation cord, ammunition,
liquid chemicals, books on chemistry and
electric circuitry, bolt cutters and a brass
padlock stamped "PG&E." Police also
said they found drug paraphernalia.
Knights was arrested and charged with
arson conspiracy and other crimes.
A federal judge ruled that evidence seized
at the apartment could not be used at trial,
and the San Francisco-based 9th U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals agreed.
Knights did consent to searches when he
agreed to terms of his probation, the
appeals court found.
"But we have made it clear that this
consent must be seen as limited to
probation searches, and must stop short
of investigation searches," the court
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found.
The 9th Circuit, which has issued similar
mlings before, is at odds with the
California Supreme Court over the
legitimacy of this kind of probation
search.
Two other states, Arkansas and Georgia,
have rules similar to California's,
according to a survey by the Rutherford
Institute. The generally conservative legal
group filed a friend-of-the-court brief on
Knights' behalf.
Other states require police or probation
officers to meet specific conditions before
they can search probationers' homes.
The case is United States v. Knights, 00-
1260.
Copyright 0 2001 The Associated Press
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Also This Tenn:
00-973 United States v. Vonn
Ruling Below (9 Cr., 224 F.3d 1152):
Government's contention that guilty pleading defendant learned of his riht to counsel during
court proceedings prior to preceeding at which his plea was accepted,a nd that district
court's failure, in violation fo Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c), to advise defendant at latter hearing of his
right to have counsel at tial thus did not affect defendant's substantial rights, may not be
considered, given rule of cases such as UnteiState v kd, 154 F.3d 937 (9th Cir. 1998), that
court will not go beyond plea proceeding in considering whether defendant was aware of his
rights; neither prosecutor's elliptical reminder to district court at plea proceedings of it
obligation to inform defendant of right to counsel nor fact that defendant was represented
by counsel at plea proceeding provides assurance that defendant understood his right to
counsel at trial, and, therefore, district court's error was not harmless.
Questions Presented: (1) Is district court's failure to advise counseled defendant at his
guilty plea hearing that he has right to assistance of counsel at trial, as required by
Fed.R.Crim.P. 11(c)(3), subject to plain error review, rather than harmless error review, on
appeal in case in which defendant fails to preserve claim of error in district court? (2) Indetermining whether defendant's substantial rights were affected by district court's deviationfrom requirements of Rule 11(c)(3), may court of appeals review only transcript of guilty plea
colloquy, or may it also consider other parts of official record?
00-1214 Alabama v. Shelton
Ruling Below (Ala., 67 Crim. L. Rep. 356):
Suspended sentence of imprisonment on misdemeanor offense, which would be nullity ifjudge were unable to ever order sentence of imprisonment to be executed, triggers SixthAmendment right to counsel as interpreted in Scrt v ili6s, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), which heldthat right to counsel applies to defendant who is sentenced to "term of imprisonment" forpetty or misdemeanor offense.
Question Presented: In light of "actual imprisonment" standard established inA 6r VHanin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), and refined in Satt v Illmo, does imposition of suspended orconditional sentence in misdemeanor case invoke defendant's Sixth Amendment's right tocounsel?
00-1187 McKune v. Lile
Ruling Below (10 Cir., 224 F.3d 1175, 67 Crim. L. Rep. 780):Prison sex abuse treatment program that requires participants to disclose past sexualnisconduct or suffer significantly reduced personal privileges and affords no confidentialitycreates real and appreciable risk of self-incrimination, in violation of prisoners' FifthAmendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination.
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Question Presented: Does revocation of correctional institution privileges violate Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination when prisoner has no liberty interest in lost
privileges and such revocation is based upon prisoner's failure to accept responsibility for his
crimes as part of sex offender treatment program?
00-6933 Lee v. Kenna
Ruling Below (8th Cir., 213 F.3d 1037):
Habeas petitioner's claim that he was denied due process by state trial court's denial of his
motion for continuance, which he had sought in order to product alibi witnesses, was
procedurally defaulted in light of state court's decision that petitioner's motion for
continuance did not comply with state rules of procedure, which is adequate state law
ground independent of federal due process question; petitioner's claim that his default
should be excused because counsel's failure to follow state rules constituted ineffective
assistance of counsel was never presented to state court as independent ground and thus
cannot now be used to establish cause of procedural default; nor can procedural default be
excused by petitioner's claim of actual innocence, because factual basis for affidavits he relies
on as requisite new evidence existed at time of trial and could have been presented earlier,
even assuming that alibi testimony was new evidence, petitioner did not show likelihood that
reasonable jurors would not have convicted him if they had heard alibi testimony of three
family members when testimony of four prosecution witnesses refuted alibi.
Questions Presented: (1) Did Eighth circuit err by affirming district court's denial of
petition for habeas corpus because petitioner's rights under Fifth and 14' Amendments were
violated when trial court refused to grant him 19-hour continuance to contact his three
subpoenaed alibi witnesses who unexpectedly did not return after lunch break? (2) Should
hearing have been held on habeas corpus to at least consider testimony of alibi witnesses to
effect that they were told by court personnel to leave? (3) In circumstances in petitioner's
case, was his claim of federal violation regarding denied request for short continuance
procedurally barred from federal court? (4) Has petitioner made substantial showing of
actual innocence according to standard of Schlup v Ddo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), for his alibi
witnesses to be explored further to prevent fundamental miscaniage of justice?
00-9285 Mickens v. Taylor
Ruling Below (4' Cir. (en banc), 240 F.3d 348, 68 Crim. L. Rep. 531):
Habeas corpus petitioner who alleges that his trial counsel labored under conflict of interest
that rendered his representation in adequate to satisfy Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel must, under Olyera Sullism, 466 U.S. 335 (1980), establish both actual
conflict of interest on part of trial counsel and adverse effect thereof, even if trial court failed
to inquire into potential conflict about which it reasonably should have known.
Question Presented: Did court of appeals err in holding that defendant must should actual
conflict of interest and adverse effect in order to establish Sixth Amendment violation when
trial court fails to inquire into potential conflict of interest about which it reasonably should
have known?
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00-9280 Kelly v. South Carolina
Ruling Below (S.C, 540 S.E.2d 851):
Evidence introduced at sentencing phase of capital murder trial that defendant had talked
about escaping while in prison and had attempted to do so, that he had made weapon while
in prison, and that he had bragged about his crime did not implicate defendant's future
dangerousness for purposes of rule of Sintran u Suth Cndiru, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), that
when capital defendant would be ineligible for parole if sentenced to life in prison and
prosecution argues his future dangerousness as basis for imposing death penalty, defendant
is entitled to have jury informed of his parole eligibility thorough argument or jury
instruction; nor did prosecution argue defendant's future dangerousness by arguing that
defendant was worse than serial killer and by stating that "murderers will be murderers."
Question Presented: Did South Carolina courts' refusal to inform capital defendant's
sentencing jury that he would never be eligible for parole if jury sentenced him to life
imprisonment rather than to death violate Sinmnrn u South Cadir?
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